Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Master's Theses

Graduate College

8-1970

The Justification of Jehan Petit: A Fifteenth-Century Attempt to
Justify Tyrannicide
John C. Parsons

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses
Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
Parsons, John C., "The Justification of Jehan Petit: A Fifteenth-Century Attempt to Justify Tyrannicide"
(1970). Master's Theses. 3005.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3005

This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for
free and open access by the Graduate College at
ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

THE JUSTIFICATION
OF JEHAN PETIT:
A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ATTEMPT
TO JUSTIFY TYRANNICIDE •

by

.

11'

John C; Parsons

A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of Graduate
Studies in partial fulfillment
of the
Degree of Master of Arts

Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
August 1970

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

THE JUSTIFICATION
OF JEKAN PETIT:
A FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ATTEMPT
TO JUSTIFY TYRANNICIDE

John C. Parsons, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1970

The Justification of Jehan Petit was composed as an attempt to
explain the murder in 1407 of Louis, duke of Orleans, by his cousin
John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy.

The murder was politically

necessary for John to be able to dominate the French government
while the king, Charles VI, was mad.
Petit attempted to prove that the duke of Orleans had been a
tyrant, and that the murder was justifiable as tyrannicide.

The

validity of Petit’s theory demanded that he be able to prove Louis'
tyranny.

In so doing, he departed radically from the medieval

concept of a tyrant and introduced a number of charges against the
duke which, though largely groundless, did fit the murdered Louis
into Petit’s new definition.

An examination of the new definition

of tyranny and of the charges reveals the invalidity of the work.
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PREFACE

Louis of France, duke of Orleans, rates something more
than a footnote in history.

His sudden and tragic end in 1407

led to a period of civil strife between his partisans, known as
the Armagnacs, and those of the Burgundian dukes.

The Burgundian

party was triumphant, and gradually the memory of the murdered
duke of Orleans faded away, to be kept alive only by the rumors
and legends spread about him by the Burgundians.
Though his life was short, and he left no lasting impression
on the political life of his age, his murder led to the composition
of a very remarkable document.

John of Burgundy, the perpetrator

of the murder, commissioned one of his clerics named Jehan Petit
to provide him with a rational justification for the deed.

Petit

presented the world with the Justification du due de Bourgogne in
March 1408.
The actual doctrine of the Justification has been ignored in
favor of the many charges brought in it against the memory of the
dead duke of Orleans.

He is accused of having practiced sorcery,

of having attempted to kidnap the queen of France, and of attempting
to murder the heir to the throne.

Petit's line of thought, however,

is in itself extremely diverting, although to call it a proper doctrine
is perhaps incorrect.
Drawing on sources as remote as the legends about Lucifer and
on writings as important as the Policraticus of John of Salisbury,
Petit attempted to prove that the dead duke of Orleans was a tyrant.
iii
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This, then, demanded a logical rationale for tyrannicide, which
Petit also attempted to provide.

In so doing he drew on other,

equally varied sources, basing all tyranny on covetousness and
ambition.

Anyone who covets either vain honors, worldly goods,

or fleshly delights, Petit concluded, is a tyrant.

This line

of reasoning had some roots in the Policraticus, but it ignored
several more important developments which had taken place in
political thought since the Policraticus was written in the
twelfth century.
An examination of Petit's doctrine, when compared with the
newer developments in political theory, shows that he erred in
more than one respect.

His most glaring fault is that he posited

the concurrent existence of a sovereign and a tyrant within the
same kingdom, but not in the same person.

Although the king

was the legal head of state, Petit claimed, the duke of Orleans
was a tyrant.
This paper is such an examination, and compares Petit's
work with earlier works on tyranny and tyrannicide, as well as
presenting an interesting work presented in rebuttal to Petit's
Justification in 1408.

The preparation of this thesis would have been an impossible
task without the advice, criticism and suggestions offered by
Dr- John R. Sommerfeldt, to whom my principal thanks are due.
I must also express my appreciation to Mrs. Jean Dugan, who so
greatly facilitated communications when long distances made
frequent meetings impossible.

The support of my family and
iv
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the friendly interest of relatives and others whose names would
take up excessive space was of immense moral value; but I must
single out Mr. and Mrs. H. E. Hatch, of Falls Church, Virginia,
who kindly invited me into their home and made my research expe
dition so much more enjoyable.

John Carmi Parsons
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THE MEDIEVAL TYRANT

Bad government is as old as government, and since government
in some form or other is nearly as old as man himself, there have
been unworthy governments for a very long time.

Many systems of

government have been evolved, a majority of which are headed by
one man.

It is the option of this man to exercise his prerogatives

either in accordance with the accepted laws and customs of his
society, or to abandon them and rule as he sees fit, or as his
personal desires dictate.

The man who abandons the precepts of

his people and rules by his own hand has been often condemned as
an unworthy ruler.

To such a ruler the name tyrant is given.

The word was not, in its original sense, pejorative; it was
used to describe any ruler who maintained his position by strength
and force.^

During the early medieval period the term was applied

to feudal rulers who tried to extend their domains by force.

2

The

name eventually came to be given to unworthy sovereigns by common

Isidor of Seville, Etymologiarum sive originum libri X X ,
Bk. IX, c. iii, 1. 22. Ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford, 2nd. ed., 2 vols.
1957), no internal pagination given. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas,
On Kingship, Bk. i, c. i, par. 11. Trans. Gerald B. Phelan, ed.
Th. Eschmann (Toronto, 1949), pp. 7-8. The Latin edition is
St. Thomas Aquinas, De Regimene Principum ad Regem Cypri (Turin:
Marietti, 1948).
2

John of Salisbury, The Statesman's Book, Bk. VIII, c. xvii.
Trans, and ed. John Dickinson (New York, 1928), p. 336. The Latin
edition is John of Salisbury, Policratici sive de nugis curialum
et vestigiis philosophorum (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1965).
Cf. Einhard, The Life of Charlemagne (Ann Arbor, 1967), p. 24.
"It was this Charles that crushed the tyrants who claimed to rule
the whole Frank land as their own. . . . "
1
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misuse.^
Early medieval political thought recognized, as had the
ancients, that the "tyrant," in the accepted modern sense, was an
unworthy ruler, and that his state suffered under his rule.

St.

Augustine, in The City of G o d , recounted Cicero's statement that
the

republic (res publica) ceases to exist when tyranny comes into

being.

St. Augustine also

indicated that tyranny might not only

be confined to the monarchial level of government, an idea which
was to appear in later writings.

But when the monarch is unjust, or as the Greeks
say, a tyrant; or the aristocracy are unjust, and form
a faction; or the people themselves are unjust, and
become, as Scipio for want of a better name calls them,
themselves the tyrant, then the republic is not only
blemished. . . but. . . it also ceases to be. For it
could not be the people's weal when a tyrant facetiously
lorded it over the state. . . . .
4
Using Cicero's terms, Augustine attempts to prove that the Roman
republic never existed in truth.

For St. Augustine, of course,

there exists no republic except that which is founded in Christ.
His theory held that political organization is alien to man,
and must be a coercive order imposed upon the Fallen.

It is

maintained by force, but it is essential if the results of sin are
to be repressed.

God's grace which brings regeneration and ransom

3

John of Salisbury, op. cit., Bk. VIII, c. xvii (p. 336).

^St. Augustine of Hippo, The City of G o d .
Marcus Dods (New York, 1950), pp. 61-62.

Trans, and ed.
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from the captivity to sin cannot serve as the basis
for social organization since. . . it liberates only
a small minority of the mass of sinners.
Since most
men— whether they are heathen or nominal Christians—
are unredeemed. . . new means must be provided to
introduce a measure of order,_stability and peace
/in/ earthly life. . . . /God/ has established new
institutions adapted to the new conditions of sin
ful existence,_in_order to keep a check on human
greed. . . . /The/ earthly peace and order that they
make possible are no longer natural and spontaneous
but must be maintained by coercion and repression.^

Augustine's doctrine remained the dominant factor in political
thought until the rediscovery of Aristotle's Politics in the thir-

c.
teenth century.

Thus the Policraticus of John of Salisbury,

completed in 1159, still adheres to Augustinian thought, and so
". . . represents the purely mediaeval tradition unaffected by
ideas newly borrowed from classical antiquity."^

There are, how

ever, certain refinements in John's thought, dealing with the
evolution of the regal office from the Roman examples of Augustine's
time until the feudalized monarchies of John's own time.
John recognized the necessity for a divinely ordained, external
and repressive order in society, but he concerned himself much more
with the reasons for the institution of kingship.
definite, if less comforting, than St. Augustine.

He is more

John identifies

the origin of the repressive order with the beginning of kingship.
In early times, just after God had handed down the law to Moses, the

^Deane, Herbert, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augus
tine (New York, 1963), pp. 95-96, 117.
^John of Salisbury, op. cit., introduction p. xl.
^loc. cit., introduction p. xvii.
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Hebrews lived in innocence under the judges, according to the
Commandments.

Gradually the sins of the people aroused the wrath

of God and in His anger He gave them kings.

For the sins of the people caused a hypocrite**
to reign over them, and, as the Book of Kings bears
witness, tyrants were brought into power over the
people of Israel by the failings of the priests.
For the earliest fathers and patriarchs followed
nature, the best guide of life. They were succeeded
by leaders, beginning with Moses, who followed the
law, and judges who ruled the people by the authority
of the law. . . . At last, in the anger of the Lord,
they were given kings, some good, but many b a d .g

Regal government is still an external, divinely imposed order, but
now it incorporates a punitive element as well.
With the introduction of "ideas newly borrowed from classical
antiquity," specifically the translation of Aristotle's Politics
in the thirteenth century, the ancient realization of man as a
political animal was re-introduced to political theory.
organization was seen

Social

to be an integral part of human nature,

St.Thomas expressed in his important though

as

unfinished political

treatise, De Regimene Principum.

If, then, it is natural for man to live in the
society of many, it is necessary that there exist among
men some means by which the group may be governed.
For
where there are many men together and each one is looking

^For the phrase, "sins of the people caused a hypocrite to
reign," see Job 24:30, and St. Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship, Bk. I,
c. vi, par. 52 (p. 29), and c. x, par. 83 (p. 48).
^John of Salisbury, op. cit., Bk. VIII, c. xviii (p. 350).
This appears to point toward the same distinction, made by the
author of Bk. II, c. ix of Aquinas' unfinished On Kingship.
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after his own interest, the multitude would be broken
and scattered unless there were also an agency to take
care of what appertains to the commonwealth. In like
manner, the body of a man or any other animal would
disintegrate unless there were a general ruling force
within the body which watches over the common good of
all members. With this in mind, Solomon says: "Where
there is no governor, the people shall fall."

Kingship, or regal government, was seen to be a logical development
within society, rather than a punitive method.
With such divergent views on the nature of the state and its
prince, the difference between John's views on the origin of
tyranny, and those of St. Thomas, are somewhat easier to under
stand.

John stresses the relationship between the tyrant and God,

St. Thomas the relationship between the tyrant and his people.
Implicit in the Augustinian state theory was the fact that
all power is ordained by God as part of His institution of govern
ment for the Fallen.

St. Augustine says:

Nevertheless, power and domination are not
given even to /tyrants/ save by the providence
of the most high God, when He judges that the
state of human affairs is worthy of such lords.
The divine utterance is clear on this matter;
for the Wisdom of God thus speaks: "By me kings
reign, and tyrants possess the land."^

It is therefore apparent that any man in a position of authority has
been placed there by God Himself; this idea leads directly to John's

St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., Bk. I, c. i, par. 8 (pp. 5-6).
The passage from Proverbs is 11:14. John of Salisbury also uses
the analogy of the human body to illustrate the commonwealth.
^St. Augustine, op. cit., p. 172.
Proverbs 8:15.

The Scriptural reference is
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basic assumption that tyranny may exist wherever there is an element
of leadership.

Tyranny itself is the result of human greed and

ambition. ^

Thus from the root of pride creeps up ambition,
to wit the lust of power and glory, so that from
hence it draws the strength which prevents it being
trampled down. . . . Therefore it is that wealth is
poured out in wooing power; and the more a man lusts
after power, the more lavishly he spends for the
sake of it. But when such a man does attain to
power, he exalts himself into a tyrant, and spurn
ing equity, does not scruple in the sight of God
Himself to oppress and humiliate the equals of his
rank and nature. And though it is not given to all
men to seize princely or royal power, yet the man
who is wholly untainted by tyranny is rare or non
existent. -^2

John therefore held any man a tyrant who evinced greed

and ambition

to the detriment of his exercise of power.
St. Thomas, on the other hand, admitted the existence of
tyranny only on the monarchial level.

Tyranny is_the deviation-form or corruption
of kingship.
/These forms stand to each other in
the opposition of contrariety^/ In regard to this
point, Aristotle shows, first that both forms are
of the same genus, for both are monarchies, i^.j2.,
one-man governments. Second, he brings out their
differences, saying that they differ most widely,
from which it appears that they are contraries.
. . . What the difference is between tyranny and
kingship, the Philosopher declares by saying that,
in this regime, the tyrant looks to his own advan
tage, while the king_has his eye on that of his
subjects. . . . /Th£/ tyrant, since he pursues

John of Salisbury, op. cit.,Bk. VII, c. xvii (p. 282); also
Bk. VIII, c. xvii (p. 336), and c. xviii (pp. 351-352).
13loc. cit., Bk. VII, c. xvii (p. 282).
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own interest, is the very contrary of the k i n g . ^

St. Thomas therefore regarded tyranny as the decay, or decline, of
a one-man government, and as such not truly applicable to other
levels of society.

Thomas' greater concern with the entirety of

the social organism is also clearly expressed (". . . the tyrant
looks to his own advantage, while the king has his eye on that of
his subjects.").
To define the characteristics
patristic thought.

The tyrant has

of a tyrant, John again
been established in

turns to

his place

of authority by God, but he misuses his power, most generally
through use of force or through failure to adhere to the law.

Indeed all power is good since it is from
Him from whom alone are all things and from whom
cometh only good. But at times it may not be
good, but rather evil, to the particular indi
vidual who exercises it or to him upon whom
it is exercised, though it is good from the
universal standpoint, being the act of Him who
uses our ills for His own good purposes. . . .
Therefore even the rule of a tyrant, too, is
good, although nothing is worse than tyranny.
For tyranny is abuse of power entrusted by
God to man.
15
A tyrant. . . is one who oppresses the
people by rulership based on force, while he
who rules in accordance with the laws is a
prince. . . . The law is assailed, by force or
fraud, and, as it were. . . undermined by the
wiles of the serpent.
In whatever way this

St. Thomas Aquinas, In Libro Ethicorum Aristotelis Expositio,
Bk. VIII, lect. 10, as found in Appendix II, ex. 4, On Kingship,
pp. 99-100.
"^John of Salisbury, op. cit., Bk. VIII, c. xviii (p. 351).
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comes to pass, it is plain that it is the
grace of God which is being assailed. . . .
Hence the prince is a kind of likeness of
divinity; and the tyrant, on the contrary,
a likeness of the boldness of the Adversary,
even of the wickedness of Lucifer. . . .^

For John, then, the essence of tyranny lies in the abuse of power
by force.

In this sense his thought embodies the first of two dis

tinct types of tyranny recognized during the medieval period, the
so-called "regitive" or abusive t y p e . ^

A ruler becomes a regitive

tyrant when, already legitimately established, he misuses his
powers.
Patristic thought could of course have given John no concept
of the second form of tyranny, which required an understanding that
power could be acquired without God's authority.

John's expression

left no room for unlawful acquisition of power:

"For it is not the

ruler's own act when his will is turned to cruelty against his
subjects, but it is rather the dispensation of God for His good
pleasure to punish or chasten them."

1ft

With the reception of Aristotle's Politics, the acquisitive
aspect of tyranny became established and was given a clear promul
gation by Aquinas.

Even though Thomas still accepted the idea

16loc. cit., Bk. VIII, c. xvii (p. 335).
■^Coville, Alfred, Jean Petit: le Tyrannicide au Quinzieme
Siecle (Paris, 1932), p. 180.
I have adopted his names for the
two types of tyranny.
18

John of Salisbury, op. cit., Bk. IV, c. i (p. 4). The
foundation is Romans 13:2— "Whosoever resisteth the power resisteth
the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to them
selves eternal damnation."
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that a bad king was a chastisement,

19

he had earlier expressed

the idea, in the Commentary on the Sentences, that power may perhaps
not derive justly from God.

/The/ duty of obedience is, for the
Christian, a consequence of this derivation
of authority from God, and ceases when that
ceases. But. . . authority may fail to
derive from God for two reasons:
either
because of the way in which authority has been
obtained, or in consequence of the use which
is made of i t .20

The same passage continues by distinguishing the ways in which
power may unlawfully be acquired.

There are two possibilities.

First, there may be a defect in the prince himself— a personal
defect.

This would not in itself constitute an impediment to the

legality of acquisition and would still command obedience.

On the

other hand, there uight be a clear and certain defect in the method
whereby power was gained, such as simony or violence.

In this case,

Thomas says, there would exist no legitimate authority and no
obligation to obey such a ruler.

21

As to the abuse of power once it islegitimately
Thomas again distinguishes two possibilities.

acquired,

The first case

would occur when the prince ordered something done which was

•^St. Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship, Bk. I, c. x, par. 83 (p. 48).
The authority is Hosea 13:2.

20

St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences, II, dist. 44,
q. 2, a. 2, as found in A. P. d'Entreves (ed.), Selected Political
Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1959), p. 181. The italics
are mine.
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clearly against the precepts of law or virtue, at which point
there would be not only a lack of obligation to obey the tyrant,
22

but it would become imperative to disobey him. ^

In the second

possibility, a command may be given which carries the ruler out
side his own authority, in which case the subject may or may not
choose to obey.

23

The ancients had been well aware of the violent end met by
most tyrants.

Since a "tyrant" in the ancient sense of the term

(i,.£., that they maintained their positions by force or strength)
began his rule by violence, the natural corollary would be that
he also end it with violence.

This was the tenor of Aristotle's

discussion on the ends of tyrants,

o/

and apparently also of a lost

work by John of Salisbury, entitled "Of the Ends of Tyrants.
The Christian sentiment on this matter is expressed in Matthew
26:52 (". . . for all they that take the sword shall perish
with the sword.")
at face value.

John of Salisbury accepted this chapter and verse

26

John was the first medieval writer to treat the idea of
tyrannicide as a serious proposition and to evolve a doctrine based
on examples from antiquity, Christian history and the Scriptures,

22

loc. cit., p. 182.

^ibid.
^Coville, op. cit., p. 182.
25

John of Salisbury, op. cit., Bk. VIII, c. xx (p. 367).
work of John of Salisbury is not known to have survived.
26

This

loc. cit., Bk. Ill, c. xv (quoted in introduction, p. lxxiii).
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which concluded that the death of a tyrant by violence was justifiable and desirable.

27

John states no clear chain of inference,

but apparently his point of departure was a condition wherein a
ruler misused his power by commanding an act which was against the
Divine Law.

For myself, I.am satisfied and persuaded that
loyal shoulders should uphold the power of the ruler;
and not only do I submit to his power patiently, but
with pleasure, so long as it is exercised in subjection
to God and follows his ordinances.
But on the other
hand if it resists and opposes the divine commandments,
and wishes to make me share in its war against God,
then with unrestrained voice I answer back that God
must be preferred before any man on earth. ^

The legitimate right of resistance having been established,
it is necessary to justify human involvement in the end of a tyrant
John first proves by examples drawn from antiquity and Christian
history that the end of tyrants is inevitably violent.

30

But as

he himself had maintained, all power is ordained by God and, on the
authority of Romans 13:2, no human may resist such power.
solution is simply that " . . .

John's

wickedness is always punished by the

Lord; but sometimes it is His own, and at others it is a human hand
which He employs as a weapon wherewith to administer punishment to
the unrighteous."

31

27loc. cit., introduction p. lxxii, n.
28loc. cit. , Bk. VI, c. xxv (p. 258).
29loc. cit., Bk. VII, c. xx (p. 310).
30loc. cit., Bk. VIII, cc. xix-xxi.
31loc. cit., Bk. VIII, c. xxi (p. 375).

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12

John was outspoken in his condemnation of tyranny and his
justification for tyrannicide, but in this he expressed the senti
ment of his times.

The twelfth century had been robustly critical
of Kings who acted beyond their powers. The thir
teenth century was tamer by comparison.
Concerning
tyrannicide St. Thomas was more hesitant than John
of Salisbury and almost, one might say, more p r i m . ^

This is not to say that St. Thomas was any the less ready to
condemn tyranny and tyrants.

That he held a tyrannical government

to be incapable of compelling obedience has already been demon
strated.

In the Summa theologicae (I-II, q. 95, a. 4) he stated

that a ". . . tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt.
has no corresponding law."

33

. .

In'the early Commentary on Job, Thomas,

like John of Salisbury, stressed the eventual retribution which was
bound to fall upon those who used violence in obtaining power,
exercised their powers wrongly and failed to meet their responsi
bilities to their subjects.^
St. Thomas' most definite pronouncement against tyranny and in
favor of tyrannicide is found in his discussion of sedition in the
Summa theologicae (II-II, q. 42, a. 2, rep. obj. 3).

The inclusion

of tyrannicide in a discussion of sedition is significant, since

■^Gilby, Thomas, Principality and Polity (New York, 1958), p.. 289.
3^St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, I-II, q. 95, a. 4, as
found in Dino Bigongiari (ed.), The Political Ideas of St. Thomas
Aquinas (New York, 1953), p. 64.
^Gilby, op. cit., pp. 214-215.
of Job, chapter 22, verse 13.

The reference is to the book
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sedition itself implies a general, not private, uprising.

A tyrannical government is not just, because it
is directed not to the common good, but to the private
good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states. Con
sequently there is no sedition in disturbing a govern
ment of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be
disturbed so inordinately that his subjects suffer
greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from
the tyrant's government.
Indeed it is the tyrant
rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages
discord and sedition among his subjects that he may
lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny,
being conducive to the private good of the ruler and
to the injury of the multitude.35

Thomas here expresses very clearly his feelings about "the multi
tude," the entire people.

Unless the murderer of the tyrant be

vested with public authority, he cannot act lawfully.

I answer that it is lawful to kill an evildoer
in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the
whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who
has charge of the community's welfare.
Thus it be
longs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when
he has been entrusted with the care of the health of
the whole body. Now the care of the common good is
entrusted to persons of rank having public authority;
wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can
lawfully put evildoers to death.

The treatise De regimene principum also stresses the public
element, with which Thomas shows a constant concern.

Should private persons attempt on their own
private presumption to kill the rulers, even though
tyrants, this would be dangerous for the multitude
as well as for their rulers. . . .

35
36

Bigongiari, op. cit., p. 95.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologicae, II-II, q. 64, a. 3.
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Furthermore, it seems that to proceed against the
cruelty of a tyrant is an action to be undertaken, not
through the private presumption of a few, but rather
by public authority.
If to provide itself with a king belongs to the
right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the
king be deposed or have his power restricted by that
same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the
royal power.
It must not be thought that such a
multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the
tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself
to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved
that the covenant with his subjects should not be
kept since, in ruling the multitude, he did not act
faithfully as the office of a king demands. ^

The question of the authority behind tyrannicide is thus
clearly identified by Thomas with the universitas, the whole of
the kingdom, a distinction which was not made by John of Salisbury.
Even in his discussion of the murder of Julius Caesar, Thomas re
futes Cicero's defense of Brutus and the other murderers, since
Caesar had gained power ". . . b y violence and ruse, the subjects
being unwilling or even forced to accept it and there being no
recourse open to a superior who might pronounce judgment upon the
usurper.

In this case, he that kills the tyrant for the liberation

of the country, is praised and rewarded."

38

The point here is that Brutus and the conspirators had not re
ceived public mandate to do away with Caesar, and in point of fact
his murder was not justifiable as tyrannicide.

On the other hand

37

St. Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship, Bk. I, c. vi, par. 47-49
(pp. 26-27).
38

St. Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, II,
dist. 44, q. 2, a. 2, as found in Appendix II, On Kingship, p. 105.
The italics are mine.
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sedition, implying as it does a general unrest or upheaval, may
constitute a community action and hence its deposition or murder of
a tyrant would be legitimate and justifiable.

It is on this par

ticular point, private v s . public right in such matters, wherein
lies the "primness" of St. Thomas and one of the most important
differences between his political thought and that of John of
Salisbury.

This difference also points ahead nearly two and one-

half centuries to the Justification of Jehan Petit.
John of Salisbury makes no clear distinction between private
and public right to take action against a tyrant, but it is apparent
that he felt it to be an individual right, if not a duty, to de
pose or to kill a tyrant.

He posits a close relationship between

tyranny and the crime of lese-majeste (crimen maiestatis) .

Furthermore whatsoever is attempted foully and
with malice against the head, or corporate community,
of the members, is a crime of the greatest gravity
and nearest to sacrilege; for as the latter is an
attempt against God, so the former is an attack upon
the prince, who is admitted to be as it were the
likeness of deity on earth. And therefore it is
called the crime of lese-majeste, for the reason that
it is aimed against the likeness of Him who alone. . .
wears the truth of true and native majesty— to wit,
if any one undertakes aught against the security of
the prince or of the people, either directly or
through another.^g
And while there are many acts which amount to
lese-majeste, none is a graver crime than that which
is aimed against the body of Justice herself.
Tyranny
therefore is not merely a public crime, but, if there
could be such a thing, a crime more than public. And
if in the crime of lese-majeste all men are admitted

OQ

John of Salisbury, op. cit., Bk. VI, c. xxv (p. 259).
original does not have italics for lese-majeste.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The

to be prosecutors, how much more should this be true
in the case of the crime of subverting the laws which
should rule even over emperors? Truly no one will
avenge a public enemy, but rather whoever does not
seek to bring him to punishment commits an offence
against himself and the whole body of the earthly
commonwealth.4q

The connection between acts of tyranny and acts committed against
Justice means, therefore, that any individual is justified in
punishing a tyrant.

This same equation of lese-majeste and tyranny

is to be found as a major foundation of the Justification of 1408
and indeed, the tenor of Petit's entire argument is based on the
correlation, just as John of Salisbury set it out.
There is a deeper significance to John's defense of the indi
vidual right in tyrannicide.

He did not conceive that any community

could function as an organic whole without the external order pro
vided by the ruler, be he tyrant or true prince.

John devotes an

entire chapter of the Policraticus to a discussion of "The Cohesion
and Mutual Dependence of the Head and Members of the Commonwealth"
("De Coherentia capitis et membrorum rei publicae"), and concludes
that ". . . inferiors should cleave and cohere to their superiors,
and all the limbs should be in subjection to the head. . . ."41
This is the result of John's patristic foundation in the idea
that the prince and the government are imposed by God in order to
impress and enforce social and legal order upon the sinners of the

4®loc. cit., Bk. Ill, c. xv, quoted in introduction, pp. lxxiiilxxiv.
41loc. cit., Bk. VI, c. xxv (p. 258).
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world.

He had no concept of the innate social and political nature

of man, as St. Thomas had.

According to John, any action taken

without the concern of the prince, and against his person, must
necessarily be disorganized— in simple terms, every man for him/O
self.

Therefore the tyrant could be disposed of by one person,

by a few conspirators, or even by the entire community.
After the Policraticus was completed in 1159, there was no
detailed attempt to provide a rationale for the murder of a tyrant
until the appearance of Jehan Petit’s Justification in 1408.

Subse

quent writers had treated the idea only incidentally as a point
of logic or theology.

No writer pronounced as definitely in favor

of tyrannicide as did John of Salisbury until Petit took up his
pen to defend the murder in 1407 of Louis, duke of Orleans.

/9

loc. cit., introduction p. Ixxvi.
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THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF THE JUSTIFICATION

Before continuing to a detailed discussion of the Justification
of Jehan Petit, something should be said about the historical cir
cumstances under which it was conceived and written, along with
what is known about Petit himself.

The Justification was written

late in 1407 or early in 1408 in order to justify, as the title
implies, the murder of Louis of Orleans by his cousin John of
Burgundy.
After the murder of St. Thomas Becket in the twelfth century,
the Orleans murder was one of the most notorious crimes of the
middle ages.

The murder was the climax of a bitter three-decade

feud between the duke of Orleans and the house of Burgundy.

The

roots and ramifications of this struggle were complex, and only
the briefest indication of their nature can be given

h e r e . ^3

Charles V of France died aged forty-two in 1380, leaving as
his heir his son, aged eleven.

After a brief but nasty quarrel

43

The chief work on the reign of Charles VI is Henri DuvalPineu, Histoire de France sous le regne de Charles VI (Paris, 2 v o l s .,
1842). The best biography to date of Louis of Orleans is Edmond
Jarry's La Vie Politique de Louis Ier due d'Orleans (Paris, 1889).
The most recent works on the Burgundian dukes are both by Richard
Vaughan and are the first two volumes of a projected four-volume
series on the Valois-Burgjindian dynasty:
Philip the Bold (Cambridge,
1962), and John the Fearless (London, 1966). The very fine bio
graphy of the duke of Berri by the late Frangoise Lehoux (Paris,
4 vols., 1968) is very useful and informatively, if exhaustively,
detailed. Much interesting information may be found in Marcel
Thibault's life of the queen, Isabeau of Bavaria (Paris, 1901).
A good general survey is found in Henri Martin, Histoire de
France (Paris, 10 vols., 1878).
18
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among the surviving princes of the Blood, it was agreed that the
late king's three brothers should act as a council of regency for
their nephew.

In order of seniority these princes were the dukes

of Anjou, Berri, and Burgundy.

Within two years, Anjou had left

France to conquer for himself the kingdom of Naples, leaving behind
the nonentity Berri and the politically astute Burgundy.
In 1368, Philip of Burgundy had married the heiress to the
domains of the count of Flanders, thereby doubling his personal
territory.

He was anxious to consolidate these scattered lands

into a single administrative unit, though geographical unity was
impossible.

He achieved his aims through eight years of ruth

less exploitation of the resources of the French kingdom.

In 1388,

Charles VI finally managed to extricate himself from his uncle's
tutelage and began his personal reign.
The king was a likeable spendthrift, in his early twenties
when he finally took over the government.

He was very fond of his

only surviving brother Louis, whom he invested with the duchy of
Orleans in the spring of 1392.

Shortly thereafter, the king's

heredity overcame him; he succumbed to his mother's madness, and
once again the kingdom was without a king.
Immediately there flared up another vicious quarrel among the
royal dukes over the regency.

In law, the duke of Orleans should

have been made regent, since he was the king's brother; the dauphin
was still a minor.

Philip of Burgundy, politically experienced

far beyond Orleans' background, superseded him and within a very
short time had regained his former powers.

In succeeding years
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he successfully quashed virtually every attempt on the part of the
duke of Orleans to gain for himself a small voice in the government.
Philip should not have been surprised to find that, by 1400,
Orleans had begun to adopt a clearly anti-Burgundian policy in his
private affairs.

Orleans was personally wealthy; he began to

purchase large amounts of land outside his personal apanage, all
of it strategically located to frustrate communications between the
scattered Burgundian lands.

He likewise pursued a program of

personal alliances with foreign princes, particularly in Germany,
aimed at crippling Burgundian influence in the Empire.
A further source of much antagonism was the Great Schism,
which was then troubling all Europe.

In 1398, Burgundy caused

France to subtract obedience from the Avignon pontificate, to
which the kingdom had previously given its allegiance.

This was

done against the agonized protests of the duke of Orleans.

In

1403, behind his uncle's back, Orleans persuaded his mad brother
to sign letters restoring obedience to Benedict XIII at Avignon.
Philip of Burgundy died in 1404 and was succeeded by his son
John, called the Fearless.

Louis of Orleans benefitted from this

change and soon managed to make himself head of the royal council;
within a very short time he succeeded in eliminating the Burgundian
party from the government.

Philip the Bold had made the error of

laying the foundations of his state on French diplomatic and finan
cial backing; once Louis of Orleans gained power, the Burgundian
state could look forward to the disruption of its policies.

Louis

cut off all financial payments to the duchy of Burgundy except the
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duke's small personal income, and his own diplomatic policies
spelled ruin for Burgundian goals.
In 1405, John of Burgundy invaded Paris with a considerable
army, against which Orleans fielded his own sizeable force.

Only

last-minute negotiations by the aged duke of Berri and the frantic
queen prevented the outbreak of open civil war.

In December, 1405,

the queen, Orleans and Berri signed a secret pact against Burgundy
before admitting him to membership on the council.

Orleans had

already made sure that the council was packed with his own friends,
having learned that trick from Philip the Bold.

Burgundian in

fluence remained minimal; month after month of fruitless
politicking by John of Burgundy failed to change the makeup of the
council.

Where armed force and diplomacy had failed, murder at

last succeeded.

On the evening of 23 November 1407^ Louis of

Orleans was brutally hacked to death in a Paris thoroughfare.
Two days later, the duke of Burgundy confessed to his relatives
that the assassins had been in his pay; he was obliged to flee
from the city.
It was not until January, 1408, that John of Burgundy again
met with the other princes at Amiens.
that he might return to Paris.

At that time it was agreed

With him at Amiens was a large

retinue including Jehan Petit, master of theology and doctor at the
University of P a r i s . ^

Although the assumption that Petit began

to work on the Justification following the Amiens conference would

^ R i c h a r d Vaughan, John the Fearless (London, 1966), p. 69.
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seem valid, the contemporary chronicler Monstrelet records that the
idea of such a work had taken root somewhat earlier.

In December

1407, John had met with the Estates of his county of Flanders, and
promised to give them an explanation of his action by presenting
to them written articles.

"And these articles, which he caused

to be put forth, were the same as, or similar to, those proposed
in Paris by master Jehan Petit.

..."

45

It is also apparent from Monstrelet's chronicle that Petit did
not work alone.

While the Justification itself was most probably

his work in form, Monstrelet says that John of Burgundy ". . . had
with him three masters in theology, greatly renowned and famous,
from the University of Paris; namely, master Jehan Petit, who later
spoke for him in Paris, and two others.

..."

46

It is unfortunate

that Monstrelet, who usually gave a good deal of attention to
detail, chose to omit the names of the other two men; a certain
Pierre Aux-Boeufs has been suggested as having been one of them.

47

That the others were, in fact, collaborators is proved by Monstrelet,
who says that all three " . . .

spoke publicly before the council

and the princes at Amiens, saying that it was permissible for the
duke of Burgundy to have killed the duke of Orleans, saying also
that if he had not done so, he would have sinned greatly. . . . "

45

48

Monstrelet, Enguerran de, Chronique (Paris, 2 vols., 1857),
I, p. 172.
46

loc. cit., pp. 173-174.

d Avout, Jacques, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons (Paris, 1943), p. 97.
48

Monstrelet, op. cit., I, p. 174.
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The Burgundians entered Paris in the middle of February 1408,
and on the seventeenth, ". . . a Latin manifesto glorifying the
assassination as an altruistic act of statesmanship.

. . was sub-

mitted to the ducal chancery, but not actually published."

49

This

was almost certainly the original manuscript of the Justification.
Jehan Petit did not, however, present his work until a public
reading on 8 March 1408, when he held forth for four hours before
a number of royal and noble listeners including the young dauphin. ^
Little is known of Jehan Petit.

He does not have a very good

reputation today, largely due to the mud which he tried to sling at
Orleans and which recoiled on his own head.

Louis Calmette, in an

admirable survey of the Valois dukes of Burgundy, describes Petit's
work as

. . the most representative of all those produced by the

group of rather disreputable university clerks, ready to turn their
hand to anything, who were part of John the Fearless' entourage.
Petit was no mere cleric, although he was an ordained priest.

52

He was, in fact, a doctor of theology, holding the degree from the
University of Paris.

He was born in the Pays de Caux in Normandy,

perhaps in the region known as the valley of Bacqueville.

The

dates of his later university career indicate that he came into the

49
50

Vaughan, op. cit., p. 69.
loc. cit., p. 70.

"^Calmette, Louis, The Golden Age of Burgundy (New York, 1963),
p. 201.
52
He was not, however, a "cordelier" as Douet-d'Arcq states, in
Monstrelet, op. cit., I, p. 177, n. 2. See Coville, op. cit., p. 9.
There is no evidence to connect Petit with any specific Order.
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world between 1360 and 1364, but nothing is known of his family.
He completed his education at Paris between 1381 and 1385, for
Pierre Playoul, from whom he obtained his license, was chancellor
at Paris during those years.

Petit was ordained before 1389, but

he does not appear as a doctor until 1405, roughly three years
before he concocted the Justification. ^
He was a poet of sorts.

There survives a manuscript containing

five poems attributed to him, of which a Disputacion des Pastourelles
deserves mention.
1390.

54

The work, in 1856 lines, is tenatively dated

Like the Roman de la Rose, it is a dream poem, but instead

of discussing the drawbacks of courtly love, ten beautiful and
learned virgins debate with ten elderly, non-virginal harridans
on the merits and validity of the Virgin Birth.
Petit's connection with the Burgundian party seems to have

resulted from his vehement attacks against Pope Benedict XIII, the
Avignon pontiff involved in the subtraction and restoration of
obedience between 1398 and 1403.

The Burgundians were Benedict's

worst enemies and Petit was apparently the spokesman for the antiBenedictine party at Paris; this most probably brought him to the
duke's attention.

56

This would appear to have taken place during

or after the restoration of obedience.

53

Coville, op. cit., pp. 5-8.

54

loc. cit., pp. 10-11. The Manuscript is Ms. fr. 12470 in the
Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris.
xbxd.
"*^d'Avout, op. cit., p. 97.
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The presentation of the Justification was the high point of
Petit's career.

Later, attacks were brought against it by Gerson

and others who perceived the danger inherent in his doctrine.
Petit wrote a second, lesser Justification and some smaller
propositions against his opponents, none of which are of much
interest except that the Policraticus is used as an authority
.
.
.
57
from time to time.
Petit lived but a short while after his hour of glory.

The

duke of Burgundy gave him a provostship somewhere in Picardy, the
exact location of which is not known.

Petit died in the city of

Hesdin on 15 July 1411, aged about fifty or a few years less.

His

place of burial remains unknown, but his heirs caused no small
amount of trouble to the Burgundian chancery by repeated claims on
his not inconsiderable estate.

58

Less than three years after his

death, Gerson secured the condemnation of the Justification, and
the work was burned in Paris on 25 February 1414.

59

There are a number of isolated manuscripts of the Justification
in Europe.
in 1414.

The original is lost; it was probably the copy burned
The copy in the Staatsbibliothek in Vienna is thought to

be the most authentic; there are two manuscripts in the Bibliotheque
royale at Brussels, three in Paris at different libraries, and one
each in the Musee Conde at Chantilly and the Bibliotheque municipale

John of Salisbury, op. cit., introduction p. lxxv.
58

Coville, op. cit., pp. 399-402.

59loc.
-,
cit., p. 137.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

at Lyon.^

There is only one printed version, copied into the

chronicle of Enguerran de Monstrelet.

Coville has demonstrated

through comparison with the manuscripts that Monstrelet, or whoever
it was that copied the Justification into his work, was either very
lazy or else was working from a condensed text.^

While the work

is formally complete, Monstrelet or his copyist omitted much of
the rhetorical language, with the result that the text in the
chronicle is much quicker and easier to read, although the emotional
and dramatic appeal which Petit undoubtedly sought to achieve is
lost.

The basic material of the text found in Monstrelet's work

shows no serious differences from any of the manuscripts.

62

Monstrelet also included in his chronicle an interesting work
which was the very first counter-proposition to the Justification.
This untitled work, presented by its author on 11 September 1408,
was prepared by Thomas du Bourg, abbot of Cerisy from 1399 to 1427;
he spoke in the name of the widowed duchess of Orleans.

63

The cere

monial of the previous March was played out again, except that the
duke of Burgundy was absent.

Among the listeners were the queen and

her son the dauphin, a child who by this time must have entertained
serious doubts as to the stability of members of his family other

^loc. cit., pp. 141-142.
61
loc. cit., p. 142.
6?

loc. cit., pp. 142-144.

63

For the identification of the Abbot of Cerisy, see loc. cit.,
p. 232, and Monstrelet, op. cit., I, p. 268, n. 1. See also d'Avout,
op. cit., p. 101. Cerisy is near Bayeux, in Normandy.
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than his father the king.
In the subsequent discussion of the Justification, frequent
reference will be made to the rebuttal of the Abbot of Cerisy,
a work which seems oddly enough to have been preserved intact
by Monstrelet, and not abridged as was the Justification.
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THE DOCTRINE OF
THE JUSTIFICATION

When the Justification received its first reading in March
1408, few persons outside the Burgundian party were impressed with
it.

The reading was attended by the contemporary chronicler known

only as the Monk of St. Denis, a thorough if not wholly unbiased
writer who has been described as ". . . of Burgundian sympathies.
The Monk's opinion of Petit's work can hardly be regarded as
enthusiastic, Burgundian sympathies or no.

I remember that many considerable and learned
persons who were there found this reading reprehen
sible in many points. I was disposed to share their
opinions; but I leave it to the venerable doctors
in theology to decide whether the reasons presented
by the speaker must be regarded as erroneous or
ridiculous.
65
When the Abbot of Cerisy presented his rebuttal to Petit in September
1408, he attacked the Justification as a crime graver than the actual
assassination.

It may be said that the justification of this
murder is a greater sin than the murder itself, for
it is obstinate perseverance in sin. For sin is a
human thing, but perseverance therein is a public
thing. And to justify this murder publicly is to
defend one's own sin. Thus, who defends his own

^d'Avout, op. cit., p. 410.
^Monstrelet, op. cit., I, p. 243, n. 1. The original Latin
describes the reasons as ". . . erronea vel ridiculosa."

28
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sin, resists God in upholding that which God hates.

Modern scholarship has been no less unfavorable to Petit's work.
Jacques d'Avout's history of the civil wars which grew out of the
quarrel between the two dukes speaks of the " . . .

fantasy and

malicious gossip in which /Petit/ deliberately placed himself.
The recent history of the Burgundian state under John the Fearless,
by Richard Vaughan, describes the Justification as ". . . one of
the most insolent pieces of political chicanery and theological
casuistry in all history."

68

In its way, each of these opinions— two of them, it should
be noted, contemporary— is true.

That of the Monk of St. Denis is

the most forceful, coming as it does from a writer who was no friend
of the duke of Orleans, but who could not bring himself to accept
Petit's ideas.

The Abbot of Cerisy, after rebutting the charges

laid at Orleans' door, presented a theological attack on the work.
The modern reader is struck by several weaknesses in Petit's
reasoning, the most immediately apparent of which is Petit's strong
bias against the duke of Orleans.

This is, of course, due to his

position in the Burgundian establishment; he wrote to please and
to defend his master.

More important from the point of view of

his doctrine, however, is the fact that the Justification was not

66

Abbot of Cerisy, untitled proposition in rebuttal of the
duke of Burgundy, in Monstrelet, op. cit., I, p. 313.
67
68

d'Avout, op. cit., p. 101.
Vaughan, op. cit., p. 102.
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written to defend the idea of tyrannicide in general.

The major

premise of the work introduces evidence that tyrannicide is a
worthy endeavor, but the "proof" of the entire work lies in the
joining of the major and minor premises.

The minor premise is

weakened by two faults.
First, the proofs of the minor are concerned not with tyrants
in general but with the duke of Orleans in particular; thus all
the evidence presented in the major had to be tailored to fit the
crimes attributed, in the minor, to the duke of Orleans.

In other

words, Petit was working not with the murder of any tyrant, but
with the murder of the "tyrant" duke of Orleans.
the second, and more serious, fault in the minor:

This leads to
in attempting

to prove that Orleans was a tyrant, Petit had to depart from the
accepted medieval definition of a tyrant.

/For the medieval period/ tyranny signifies a
government born of usurpation or exercised by vio
lence and malfeasance for the sole profit of the
tyrant. There is no question of the abuse of power,
the intrigues, the excessive ambition, or the
manoeuvres— whatever they may have been— of a prince
who was only beside the throne in the structure of
a recognized, legitimate and regular monarchy, with
its judicial structure.
Jean Petit had in conse
quence great difficulty in adapting the facts of .
his minor with the theory set forth in his major.
It is in this sense that it may be said tha£ he
has largely abused the authorities to which he
refers, and deliberately misconstrued the opinions
of the authors he cites.gg

Consequently the Justification must be approached with a good deal

^^Coville, op. cit., pp. 217-218.
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of caution.

Very little in it may be taken literally; many of

Petit's authorities, when examined carefully, are found to be
erroneous, misquoted or attributed to their source with little or
no actual foundation.
Scholastically, the form of the work is hard to fault.

The

syllogism is entirely respectable.
Major premise:

It is permissible to kill a tyrant.

Minor premise:

The duke of Orleans was a tyrant.

Conclusion:

The duke of Burgundy did no wrong in killing
him.

The entire major premise is built on a single text, I Timothy 6:10—
"Covetousness is the root of all evil, which while some have lusted
after, they have erred from the f a i t h . " C o v e t o u s n e s s " is the
sense in which Petit takes the Latin "cupiditas," which may in fact
mean any one of several types of greed or cupidity.

The ambiguous

"covetousness" ("convoitise") allows Petit to read three lesser
forms of greed into "cupiditas."
From his proposed text, Petit draws three "elements" which
correspond to the first three articles of the major premise:

first,

that covetousness is the root of all evil; second, that covetousness
may lead men into apostasy; and third, that covetousness may turn
men into traitors.

There is, in fact, no clear foundation for the

third element within the proposed text itself; but Petit includes
it in a bit of doggerel which

serves to set forth the three elements.

^OPetit, Jehan, Justification du due de Bourgogne, in Monstrelet,
op. cit., I, p. 184. This is a translation of Petit's rendering of
the verse; the translation is mine.
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The rhyme would be lost in translation; the French is therefore
retained and followed by the translation.

Dame convoitise est de tous maulx la racyne,
Puis q u ’on est en ses las et on tient sa doctrine.
Apostas elle a fait aucuns, tant l'on amee;
Les autres desloyaux.
Bien est chose d a m p n e e . ^
Lady Covetousness is the root of all evils,
When one is in her toils and follows her counsel.
Some she has made apostates, who love her;
Others she has made disloyal.
Surely this is damnable.

The fourth article of the major premise contains eight "truths" and
concludes with nine corollaries derived from them.

The minor premise

consists of the various crimes imputed to the duke of Orleans and
the manner in which they correspond to the theoretical exposition
of the maj o r .
Before launching his extended discussion of his theory, Petit
provides a diffuse prologue in which he touches on a number of
matters.

First of all, he stresses the feudal obligations which

the duke of Burgundy owes his cousin, the king.

Petit lists

twelve.

He is obliged among other mortals to protect,
defend and avenge /the king/ against all injuries
insofar as it is in his power; and this he has
clearly recognized, does now recognize, and, if
God please, will continue to recognize, and will
have in his heart and mind the obligations set
forth above, which are twelve in number. To wit,
as a /true Christian/, close relative, vassal,
loyal subject, baron, count, duke, peer, dukepeer, the doyen of all the peers, and the two

^ibid.

The translation is mine.
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marriages /of his daughter with the kin&'s son,
and of his son with the king's daughter/.

Petit continues with his own excuses for being such a poor, unlearned
and unimportant man, especially when he considers " . . .

the grandeur

JO

of the persons of whom it is necessary to speak.
high company in which he finds himself.

. . .

and the

After appealing to the

saints for help, he carefully clears his skirts of all responsibility
in this matter.

I would never have dared to speak of this
matter, nor to say the things I have been charged
to say, if it were not by the commandment of my
lord of Burgundy.
I protest that I intend to injure no person,
living or dead. And if it should happen that I
utter words seemingly injurious to anyone, in the
name of my lord of Burgundy and at his commandment,
I do pray that I shall be excused, insofar as.they
will be for his justification and for nothing e l s e . ^

This passage has been interpreted to indicate a rather deeper con
cern in the writing of the Justification on the part of the duke of
Burgundy himself than has generally been suspected.73

Having at

any rate set his own mind at ease, Petit gives his text and his
doggerel, and proceeds thence to the first article.

72ioc. cit., p. 180.

For the original text, see Appendix.

73loc. cit., p. 182.
74

loc. cit., p. 183.

For the original text, see Appendix.

73d'Avout, op. cit., p. 97, speaks of " . . . la part importante
d'inspiration, de documentation et de correction qu'y apporta
vraisemblablement le due de Bourgogne en personne." John the
Fearless seems frequently to have fancied himself a jurist.
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In the first article, according to the "elements" originally
set forth, Petit seeks to prove that Lady Covetousness is the root
of all evils.

His authority is I John 2:15-16, a passage which,

it should be noted, he at first attributes to the pen of St. John
Baptist.7^

From this verse are derived three lesser divisions,

or "daughters" of covetousness.

Love not the world, neither the things that are
in the world.
If any man love the world, the love
of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the
world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the
eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father,
but is of the world.

The three subdivisions are the desire for vain honors ("pride of
life"); desire for worldly riches ("the lust of the eyes"); and as
Petit delicately phrases it, "delectacion charnelle" ("the lust of
the flesh.")77

Thus it appears clearly by this article of
St. John that these three types of covetousness
contain in themselves all sins. . . . And thus
the Apostle means, in the text set forth above.
And when he says, covetousness is the root of
all evil, it is to be understood that covetous
ness includes the three types spoken of above,
set forth by St. John. . . . Thus it appears
that my first article is clearly true and valid,
when I say that covetousness is the root of
all evils, taking it to mean the same thing that
the Apostle meant when he said that covetousness
is the root of all evil.^g

7^Petit, op. cit., p. 185.
77loc. cit., p. 186.
78

ibid.

For the original text, see Appendix.
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The second article introduces the theory that among the sins
originating in covetousness if that of lese-majeste.

Unlike John

of Salisbury, Petit distinguishes two kinds of lese-majeste, divine
and human.^9

To begin the second article, I make the sup
position that one of the gravest sins that may be
is the crime of lese-majeste. And the reason for
this is, that the royal majesty is the most noble
and most dignified thing that may be, so that one
can commit no greater sin than to injure the royal
majesty; and from this it follows that since the
crime is so great, the punishment is greater. To
understand which, it must be known that there are
two kinds of majesty.
The first is divine and per
petual; the other is human and temporal.gQ

Petit defines two lesser degrees of divine lese-majeste and four
degrees of human lese-majeste.

Divine lese-majeste may be committed

either directly against God, as in heresy or idolatry, or against
the Church, as in schism.

"Thus, I mean to say that heretics and

idolators commit the crime of divine lese-majeste against God,
f 81
in the first degree, and are schismatic, in the second degree."
Human lese-majeste may consist, in the first degree, of an injury
done directly to the person of the prince himself; in the second
degree, of an offense committed against the person of the prince's
spouse; in the third degree, of an injury done to the prince's
children; and in the fourth degree, of any action which may injure

79

Cf. supra, p. 15.

80
Petit, op. cit., p. 187.

For the original text, see Appendix.

81,
loc. cit., p. 188.
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the public good.

82

Petit sets forth the gravest penalties for

committing such crimes.

And since. . . these crimes are the most horrible
that may be, the laws have ordained special punish
ments, greater than for other crimes. That is to say,
that in a case of heresy Ai-.e* > divine lese-majeste/
or human lese-majeste, a man may be accused after
his death, and may be tried. And if it should
happen that he be convicted of heresy, he must be
dug up, and his bones put into a bag and brought
to justice by being burned in a fire. And simi
larly, if it should happen that he be convicted
of human lese-majeste after his death, he must
be dug up, all his moveable and immoveable goods
forfeit, confiscated by the prince, and his chil
dren declared unable to inherit anything.g^

The connection between divine and human lese-majeste had not been
anticipated by John of Salisbury, but it remained current in French
law until the Revolution.

In 1757, a deranged half-wit named Robert

Damiens attempted to assassinate Louis XV and succeeded in inflicting
a slight wound on the king's body.

Damiens was tried before the

Parlement of Paris on the charge of divine and human lese-majeste,
was convicted and executed after suffering appalling tortures; his
body was burned.

82

ibid., but Monstrelet or his copyist has left out the
actual third degree and has substituted the actual fourth
degree for it, so that there are only three given at this
point. The list must be reconstructed from later passages
dealing with the third and fourth degrees, and from the
corresponding passages in the rebuttal of the Abbot of
Cerisy.
83

ibid.

For the original text, see Appendix.

^Grammont, Sanche de, Epitaph for Kings (New York, 1968),
pp. 165-166.
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Petit's authorities in the second article, to prove that
covetousness may impel men to commit lese-majeste, are drawn from
Roman history, early Christian history and the Bible.
three examples.

There are

The first is that of Julian the Apostate who,

according to Petit, was driven by the desire for vain honors and
renounced the Christian faith in order to gain favor among the
"Sarrasins," who eventually made him Emperor as he had hoped.

85

The second example is of the apocryphal monk, Sergius, who according
to tradition apostatized in order to gain riches by doing missionary
work for Mohammed; according to Petit, Sergius was responsible for
the conversion of ". . . all the lands of Araby, Syria, Africa, Belmarino, Morocco, Grenada, Tunisia in Barbary, Persia, Egypt and many
other places. . . . "

86

(Numbers 25:6-8, 14-15).

The third example is the story of Zambri
Petit's dissertation on the brief account

found in Numbers adds several pointed details.

The third example is of a prince and duke of
Simeon, which was one of the twelve tribes of the
children of Israel, which prince was a very power
ful and a great lord, and was named Zambri. He
was seized by covetousness and carnal desire, as
he loved a pagan woman, who would not accord him
his will of her unless he worshipped her idols.
He worshipped them, and made many of his subjects
worship them, as the Holy Scripture says. . . .
Whereat God was much angered, and said to Moses,
who was the sovereign lord and duke of all the
people, "Take all the princes of the people and

Petit, op. cit., pp. 189-192. The legend of Julian's
miraculous death at the hand of the martyr Mercurius, under
the orders of the Virgin, is taken almost verbatim from the
Policraticus, Bk. VIII, c. xxi.
loc. cit., p. 193.
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cause them to be hanged before the sun." And
why did he say this? Because most of them had
consented to this crime. And those who had not,
were negligent in punishing this very great
injury done to God their Creator. As soon as
Moses had assembled all the people of Israel and
told them what God had ordered, the people began
to weep, since these persons, the malfactors,
were so powerful that the judges would not dare
to bring them to justice. . . . But a valiant
man named Phineas took courage and said in his
heart, "I vow to God that presently I shall
avenge this wrong." Without saying anything,
without any order from Moses, nor from anyone
else having power, he went to the lodging where
he found this duke with his woman, taking their
pleasure with each other, and with his pike, like
a dagger, he killed them both together.g^

There are implications in this passage which, though they are
not readily apparent to the modern reader, must have been clear to
the listener in 1408.

Petit has transformed Zambri, not to mention

Moses himself, into a prince and duke, whereas in Numbers Zambri is
nothing more than the son of a chief.

He is, Petit says, a man

so powerful that the authorities would not dare to punish him even
for so terrible a crime— in short, a man of high rank who, though
guilty of great sins, was above the law until one "valiant man"
plucked up his courage and killed the sinner.

The pagan woman

of this episode may perhaps be a veiled reference to Orleans' wife,
an Italian princess unjustly suspected by many of having caused
the king's madness by sorcery.

Another possibility is that the

pagan woman was intended to represent the queen herself, since
Orleans had for years been suspected of having become that lady's

87

loc. cit., pp. 193-194.

For the original text, see Appendix.
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lover shortly after the king lost his mind; on the night he was
murdered, he had just left the queen's private residence after
dining with her in private when he was attacked in the street and
killed.

88

Whichever lady was depicted, the real import behind

the story was not so much that Zambri himself was guilty of divine
lese-majeste, but rather that a private individual could arm him
self to kill another, whom no one else would dare to kill, without
a mandate from any source of authority.
Thus far the reasoning developed by Petit is that, spurred on
by one of several varieties of covetousness, a man may commit one
or both types of lese-majeste.

In the third article, Petit goes on

to explore the relationships between covetousness, lese-majeste and
acts of treason, as he set forth in his prologue.

As to the third article of my major, I shall
show by examples and by authorities from the Bible,
which none may contradict, that Lady Covetousness
has made many persons traitors and disloyal toward
their sovereign lords; I could give numerous
examples and authorities, as many from the Bible as
from anywhere else, but I shall restrain myself to
three.gg

The examples include Lucifer, David's son Absalom and the Jewish
queen, Athaliah.

The case against Lucifer is based on two Scriptural

references; the first is Isaiah 14:12, which is the more explicit

88

It was popularly supposed that Orleans had fathered
the queen's twelfth child, Philippe, who died at birth on
10 November 1407— less than two weeks before the duke's
murder.
There is little if any evidence to support this.
89

Petit, op. cit., p. 195.
see Appendix.

For the original text,
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of the two:

"How thou art fallen from heaven, 0 Lucifer!

. . . For

thou hast said in thine heart, I will ascend into heaven, I will
exalt my throne above the stars."

The second reference, Petit

helpfully says, is from John the Evangelist,
Revelation 12:7-8.

90

and is found to be

This passage is sufficiently remote to mean

almost nothing, but Petit provides an eyewitness account.

_As soon as St. Michael saw /what Lucifer had in
mind/ he went right to him and said to him that it
was a very bad thing to do and that he ought never
to wish to do any such thing, and that, since God
had made him /Lucifer/ the most handsome and the
most perfect of all the others, so ought he to give
more reverence, subjection and obedience to Him who
had made him, who was his king and sovereign lord.
Lucifer answered that he would do no such thing.
St. Michael said that neither he nor any of the other
angels would suffer such injuries to their creator
and sovereign lord.
Briefly, a battle was joined
between Lucifer and St. Michael. . . . S t . Michael
dealt to Lucifer a lasting death, for this Lucifer
and the other angels of his band were chased by
force out of paradise and cast into hell. Of which
St. John the Evangelist says, "Michael and his
angels fought against the dragon, and the dragon
fought, and his angels, and prevailed not; neither
was their place found any more in heaven.

The story of Absalom is also distorted to fit the circumstances.
Absalom was killed by a certain Joab, whom David, on his deathbed,
ordered to be slain by Solomon, as recorded in 1^ Kings 2:5, where
David says, "Moreover thou knowest also what Joab the son of Zeruiah
did to me, and what he did to the two captains of the hosts of
Israel, unto Abner.

. . and unto Amaza.

. . whom he slew. . . . "

^ l o c . cit., p. 197.
91

loc. cit., pp. 196-197.

For the original text, see Appendix.
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Petit has it that Joab's death was due only to the murders of Abner
and Amaza, and not for the killing of Absalom.

_
But some may argue against what I have said
/concerning the death of Absalom/ since, when King
David was on his deathbed, he charged his son
Solomon, who was to be king after him, that he
bring Joab to justice.
To this, I answer that it
was not for the above reason.
For, notwithstanding
that Joab was a good knight and loyal at the time
he slew Absalom, nonetheless near the end of his
days_he slew a very great knight named Amaza. . . .
/and/ the prince Abner, also by gross betrayal.^

The

actual wording of the passage

from 1^ Kings above shows that

David did, in fact, have Absalom's death in mind when he said that
Solomon should remember what Joab did "to me" as well as to Abner
and Amaza.
The story of Athaliah is correctly given by Petit as
II Chronicles 22.

It

is moreover

found in

the only example of the three in

this article wherein Petit demonstrates his developing doctrine.

Thus you have the third example, which is to
show how desire for vain honor— which is nothing
but concupiscence and disorderly intent to steal
from another his noble domination and lordship—
caused this queen to be a murderess, false and
disloyal, in order to obtain by tyrannical force
the crown and lordship of the kingdom of Jeru
salem. And you have heard how by secret plots
she was slain. For it is completely reasonable
and equitable that all tyrants be killed like
villains, by secret plots, and this is the proper
death by which all disloyal tyrants must d i e . ^

loc. cit., p. 201.
^loc.

For the original text, see Appendix,

cit., pp. 202-203.

For the original text, see Appendix.
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Thus the progression is that spurred on by desire for vain honor, or
by one of the other types of covetousness, a person may commit acts
of lese-majeste, whereby he becomes what Petit calls a "disloyal
tyrant" ("tirant desleal").
As in the second article, Petit's choice of examples reveals
allusions to the duke of Orleans.

Absalom was the son of a king,

like the duke, and was killed when he attempted to wrest the king
dom from its rightful ruler; in the minor premise, Petit charges
that Orleans had illicit designs on the French throne.

Athaliah

was a king's wife, who unlawfully seized the crown by murdering
the legitimate heirs to the throne; likewise, in the minor, Petit
asserts that the duke of Orleans attempted to poison his nephew,
the young dauphin, in order to gain the throne.
Petit's unusual use of the term "disloyal tyrant" is a con
fusing element of his reasoning.

According to the recognized defi

nition of a tyrant after the thirteenth century, the tyrant had to
be a monarch.

It would hardly be possible for a sovereign to be

disloyal to himself, so it appears that Petit had abandoned the
later definition of tyranny, which restricted the existence of
the tyrant to the level of the monarch, and had instead gone back
to the older definition developed by John of Salisbury, who had,
as noted above, stressed the possibility of the existence of a
tyrant on any level.

94

The fourth article of the major premise consists of Petit's

94

Cf. supra, p. 6 .
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eight "truths" whereby he seeks to prove the justice of tyrannicide;
but he opens the article by saying that he presents this evidence
". . . the better to substantiate the justification of my lord of
Burgundy."

95

In other words, he made it plain that while he was

defending tyrannicide, he was in fact doing it only to defend this
particular murder.

The first truth is that any subject whatsoever
who by covetousness, fraud, sorcery or plots, plans
against his king and sovereign lord, in order to
take from him his noble and lofty lordship, sins so
greatly and commits so horrible a crime, the crime
of human lese-majeste in the first degree, that in
consequence he is worthy of double death. . . . I
shall prove my proposition. Any subject and vassal
/_so doinjg/ is an enemy and disloyal to his sovereign
lord and sins mortally; thus my conclusion is true.
And that he is a tyrant, I prove through St. Gregory,
who speaks thus: /"He is properly said to be a
tyrant who in the community of the republic is not
rightfully the head; but it is understood to mean
he who exercised pride in the same manner as a real
tyrant.^/ That he commits the crime of lese-majeste
is clear by the distinction given above of the
degrees of lese-majeste. . . . That he is worthy of
double death, I shall prove. For by first death I
mean corporal death, which is the separation of body
and soul; and by second death I mean nothing but
eternal damnation. . . . That is to say, that any
human creature who would have victory over covetous
ness and her three daughters will have no fear of
the second death, which is to say eternal damnation.^

The second truth, reflecting the feudal hierarchy, states that
even though the crime of lese-majeste is so terrible that it cannot

95

Petit, op. cit., p. 203.

96loc. cit., pp. 203-204. Monstrelet mutilates the passage
from St. Gregory, which is given as translated from Coville, op. cit.
p. 190.
Coville locates the passage in the Moralia. For the
original text, see Appendix.
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be over-punished, still a baron must be punished more severely than
must a knight; a count more than a baron; a duke more than a count;
the king's cousin more than a duke; the king's brother more than
the king's cousin, and the king's son even more than his brother.

For in these degrees, the obligation is greater
to protect the king's well-being and the public good.
Thus those who work against it must be punished more
severely, increasing from rank to rank. . . . That is
to say, the son is more obliged than the brother, the
brother more than the cousin, a duke more than a
count. . . to protect the well-being and the honor
of the king and the public good of the kingdom. . . .
For it is a much greater scandal for a great duke,
and powerful lord, nearly related to the king, to
plan his death to gain the kingdom. . . . Just as
the plotter, being closer to the king, is the more
iniquitous, so is it a greater scandal, and thus
the punishment must be greater.^

The heart of Petit's doctrine is to be found in the third
truth.

This contains the most emphatic pronouncement in support

of tyrannicide since John of Salisbury, and was the principal
reason for the condemnation of the Justification.

Petit does away

with the need for any lawful authority in the murder of a tyrant.

It is permissible for any subject, without any
order, according to moral, natural and divine law,
to kill or cause to be killed a disloyal traitor
or tyrant, and not only permissible, but honorable
and meritorious, particularly when he is of so
high a station that the sovereign cannot easily
bring him to justice.
I shall prove this truth
with twelve reasons, in honor of the twelve apostles.
Of which reasons, the first three are authorities
of three moral philosophers. The next three are
of three authorities of Holy Church.
The next

^Petit, op. cit., pp. 204-205. For the original text,
see Appendix.
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three are of three authorities of civil and imperial
laws. And the last three are examples of Holy Writ.^g

Again Petit displays the unusually close connection he maintained
between the idea of tyranny and the idea of treason, making it clear
that the sovereign and the tyrant could exist separately in the
same kingdom.

The reason is also clear for his inclusion of the

story of Zambri as an authority in the second article of the
major, for he laid great importance on the role of Phineas; this
man killed Zambri without any command from authority, and moreover
Petit says that Zambri was so powerful that he would not otherwise
have been brought to justice.
The immediate danger in the third truth was that it left any
person free to kill whomever he wished, with the body of Petit’s
reasoning to justify his action.

This possibility was clearly

discerned by the Abbot of Cerisy in his rebuttal a few months
afterward.

Oh princes! consider that if such doctrines be
upheld, anyone could say:
"I can kill as well, like
that." May it please you to condemn this false and
disloyal doctrine as perilous, seditious^ and abomi
nation. And say to the adverse party /Burgundy/
and to all their supporters, what Jeremiah said, in
the twentieth chapter:
"They shall be greatly con
founded who will not understand eternal damnation;
they shall not be saved nor pardoned."
99
Cerisy was also the first to point out one of the basic faults

9®loc. cit., p. 206.

For the original text, see Appendix.

^ A b b o t of Cerisy, op. cit., p. 302.
see Appendix.

For the original text,
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in Petit's work, that the "authorities" were of uncertain value in
this case.

"Thus is this doctrine surely evil, in which ancient

murders are taken and brought as examples in order to uphold this
cruel death /Orleans' m u r d e r / . C e r i s y unfortunately weakens
his own reasoning by stopping to refute each of Petit's "authorities”
one by one.^^^
Of the twelve authorities appended to the third truth few in
fact are reliably presented.

Petit also departs from his announced

sequence and presents the Church authorities before the moral
philosophers.
The first authority from the Church is St. Thomas' Commentary
on the Sentences.

Petit's comment on this authority is that

". . . the doctor means here that the subject who kills the tyrant
does a thing worthy of praise and reward."

103

In point of fact,

St. Thomas places a strict qualification on this murder; there was
no recourse open to a superior, and furthermore Caesar's domination
had been acquired by violence and ruse.

Only under such conditions,

Thomas says, can the murder of a tyrant be justified.

104

The Abbot

of Cerisy, quoting St. Thomas in full while Petit gives only a frag
ment, destroys the force of Petit's authority.

^^d'Avout, op. cit., p. 101.

102
101

Abbot of Cerisy, op. cit., pp. 301-302.
Petit, op. cit., p. 206.

^ ^ S e e supra, p. 14.
Caesar.

The murder in question is that of Julius
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This is to say, says St. Thomas, that when
anyone gains by violence the dominion without the
will of his subjects, and constrains their consent,
and one cannot have recourse to a sovereign by
whom judgment can be given, then he who kills such
a tyrant for the deliverance of his country, is
to be praised and given much reward.
To this I
say that it has no bearing at all on this case.
For my lord of Orleans never invaded any domain
violently. . . . I say that St. Thomas speaks
of him who may be seen to be a tyrant, and that
my lord of Orleans was not such, as may clearly

Petit also brings St. Peter into the argument, quoting 1^ Peter
2 : 1 3 -14.^^

He claims that the passage, "Submit yourselves to

every ordinance of men for the Lord's sake; whether it be to the king
as supreme, or unto governors /ducibus/ as unto them that are sent
by him for the punishment of evildoers.

. . . " i s correctly inter

preted to promulgate the secular authority of dukes in the name of
the sovereign.

Cerisy responds:

This authority has no bearing on this case, for
it does not seem that the Apostle meant or intended
that a duke should have the domination of the entire
kingdom, but only over his own lands.
Besides, it does
follow that in Brittany, in Berri and in the other
duchies of this kingdom, one does not have to_obey
the duke of Burgundy. Thus it is shown how /Master
Petit/ abuses the Holy Scriptures, since he attempts
to argue that this fits into his proposition.

The Latin dux is correctly translated as a governor, rather than

Abbot of Cerisy, op. cit., p. 297.
see Appendix.

For the original text,

^ ^ P e t i t , op. cit., p. 207.
■^^Abbot of Cerisy, op. cit., pp. 298-299.
text, see Appendix.

For the original
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a duke, although the moderu word "duke" is derived from the Latin.
Isidor of Seville had shown the military origin of the office some
centuries before Petit attempted to postulate the authority of a
duke over the whole kingdom.

108

An outright misuse of sources is evident when Petit, as the
first of his three moral philosophers, attributes to Aristotle
(whom he calls Anaxagoras Philippus) the sweeping statement, "It
is permissible to kill a tyrant, and not only permissible, but
laudable."

109

Alfred Coville has demonstrated that this reading

is to be found nowhere in Aristotle's works, even though Petit says
it is found " . . .

in several places.

The authorities drawn from civil and imperial law are hardly
applicable to the case in question, even though Petit confesses him
self no jurist.

Since I am no jurist, it will suffice for me
to pronounce the letter of the law without allega
tion; for in all my life I only studied law for
two years, and that was more than twenty years
past, so that I hardly knew anything, and what I
did know, I have forgotten in time. . .

The first example is that debasers and destroyers of knighthood may
be killed by anyone.

"And who is more a deserter than he who destroys

108

Isidor of Seville, op. cit., Bk. IX, c. iii (no internal
pagination given).
109

Petit, op. cit., p. 207.

■^^Coville, op. cit., pp. 182, 203; Petit, op. cit., p. 207.
■'■^Petit, op. cit., p. 208.
Appendix.

For the original text, see
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the king, the head of all knighthood, without whom it could not long
endure? " ^ 2

The second authority states that it is permissible to

kill thieves who trouble the highways and forests.

Petit finds such

thieves guilty of lese-ma.jeste in the fourth human degree, since
they are like the tyrant enemies of the public good.

113

The third

argument is that anyone may kill a thief in his house at night, both
in civil and imperial law.

"And thus, by even stronger right,

is it permissible to kill a tyrant who works by night as well as
day to kill his sovereign lord."'*''^

Cerisy's rebuttal of these

authorities aptly expresses the reaction to Petit's work and is
given in full.

The seventh reason and the two following are
founded in civil laws, which state that there are
three kinds of men whom it is permissible to kill;
that is to say, those who debase knighthood, high
waymen, and thieves in the night.
To this I say
that my lord of Orleans was never any of these.
I say also that these laws never commanded anyone
to kill, except that killing is permitted in case
of unavoidable danger; and such conditions are
far from our concern.
For my lord of Orleans was
never a highwayman, for God's sake! nor a thief
in the night. And there is no law in this world
by which the adverse party may be excused.^,.

Cerisy attacked these legal authorities on the ground that they
had no application to the duke of Orleans, an argument which Petit

112ibid.
113
114

loc. cit., p. 209.
ibid.

Abbot of Cerisy, op. cit., p. 300.
see Appendix.

For the original text,
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had anticipated and to which he had provided another argument before
the rebuttal:

he upheld a distinction between the letter and the

intent, or meaning, of a law.

To understand which, it must be known that in
every law there are two elements; the first is the
principle or the written word, and the other is the
reason why the law was made, to which end the terms
of the law most particularly are intended. And
when the written word is contrary to the intention
of the law, that is to say to the end for which
the law was made, one must interpret said law
in terms of the intention for which it was first
made, and not at all in terms of the literal
sense of the written text. . . . In this case:
the laws which say that no one may take power
without the permission of the prince, nor take
up arms without the authority of the prince, I
say were made to protect the honor of the king,
his_person and the public good. . . . /When I
see/ a very powerful tyrant subtly plotting
with all his might for the death of the king
. . . must I respect the literal sense of these
laws? Not in the least; I must defend my king,
and kill the tyrant. And in so doing, though
it be that I do something against the literal
sense of said laws, I really do nothing against
the intention for which they were made, but
rather I accomplish the intended commandment
of these laws. . . ...,

After completing his twelve proofs in support of his third
truth, Petit goes on with the remaining five truths.
summarized briefly.

They may be

The fourth truth has it that the king's enemies

should be killed by his close relatives who, as it was shown in
the second truth, have a greater obligation to him.

The fifth

and sixth truths concern the invalidity of oaths taken between

Petit, op. cit., pp. 212-213. For the original text, see
Appendix.
D'Avout, op. cit., p. 98, calls this distinction "un
peu trop subtile."
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loyal subjects and those who afterward fall into tyranny.

The

seventh seeks to justify the use of plots, spies and foul play in
the elimination of a tyrant.

The eighth condemns those who use

sorcery and unnatural means to kill the sovereign prince.
As to the nir.e corollaries appended to the eight
even briefer summary will suffice.

Each corollary

truths,an

is keyed to

fit

one of the crimes contained in the minor premise— sorcery, paying
assassins, making alliances with the king's enemies and so forth.
The third corollary should be singled out for its obvious allusion
to no other person than the duke of Orleans.

Tercium correlarium. Any subject who, under
guise and cover of play and amusement, and with
malice aforethought, and with flammable material
. . . causes clothing to be made to clothe the
king, and who causes others to be so clothed
with him, and who then sets fire to him. . . to
take from him his noble lordship, commits the
crime of /human/ lese-majeste in the first
degree and is a tyrant, traitor and disloyal
to his king, and for this is worthy of double
death, first and second; particularly when the
fire burns to death several other noble men,
with much pain and sorrow.
IJLo

The basis for this corollary, and its subsequent accusation against
the duke in the minor premise, is the famous incident of the masked
ball in Paris in January 1393, described in the chronicle of Jean
Froissart.

The king, who had just recovered from hisfirst

of insanity, was attending the ball, and appeared

spell

with some of his

^Petit, op. cit., pp. 214-217.

218
loc. cit., p. 219.

For the original text, see Appendix.
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friends disguised as savage animals; his clothing, and that of his
companions, was made of highly flammable fur and feathers.

At

some point, one of the maskers came into contact with a lighted
torch, and within moments most of the disguises were in flames.
The king was saved only by the coolheadedness of his aunt, the
duchess of Berri, who recognized him, drew him aside and threw her
mantle over him

to protect him from the flames.

Several of the

other men died,

either at once or of the burns they suffered.

There

seems to be no contemporary evidence— except rumor— to connect the
duke of Orleans with this tragedy although he was present when it
happened.

Petit, in the minor premise, accuses the duke of pur

posely setting the dancers ablaze after arranging it so that the
dancers would be disguised in flammable clothing.

Probably the

best argument against Orleans' involvement in the tragedy is the
fact that, when Charles VI drew up his will very shortly after the
ball, he nominated his brother to be regent in the event of his
own death before the dauphin's majority.

119

The charges levelled against the duke of Orleans, as set out
in the minor premise, are a series of attacks which Louis Douetd'Arcq, the editor of the 1857 edition of Monstrelet's chronicle,
described as ". . . odious.

. . others ridiculous."

120

Rather than

take up more space with critical comment, it is better to let the

Jarry, Edmond, La Vie Politique de Louis l^r due d'Orleans
(Paris, 1889), p. 102.

120

Monstrelet, op. cit., I, p. 223, n. 1.
les autres ridicules."

"Les unes sont odieuses,
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charges speak for themselves.

Now I am come to affirm and declare my proposed
minor, in which I have as my purpose to show that the
late Louis, formerly duke of Orleans, was so taken by
covetousness, vain honors and worldly riches— that is
to say, that to obtain for himself and his issue, to
take and secure for himself the very high and noble
lordship of the crown of France from the king our
lord— that he plotted and planned by covetousness,
fraud, secrecy and foul play to destroy the person of
the king and his issue, because he was so taken up
by tyranny, greed and temptation by the Adversary,
that as a tyrant toward his brother the king and his
sovereign lord, he did commit the crime of lesemajeste, divine and human, in all the ways and means
set forth in my major.

Since it is for God to judge whether the duke committed divine lesemajeste, says Petit, he will not attempt himself to prove Orleans'
guilt on that point; instead, he confines himself to proving the

122

duke's guilt on each of the four degrees of human lese-majeste.

He no sooner arrives at the first degree than he confronts the
reader with two further subdivisions of that same degree.
lies in planning the death.

"The first

. . of the prince and sovereign lord.

This manner may itself be divided into several methods, but at
present I shall only divide it into three. . . . "

123

The three

methods given by Petit are planning the king's death by sorcery,
by poison and by arms.

The charge brought against Orleans on the

first of these methods is a splendid example of the kind of ideas

121
122

Petit, op. cit., p. 223.

For the original text, see Appendix.

loc. cit., p. 224.

123^
ibid.
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with which Petit was most at home.

It is true that in order to kill the king after
a long illness and in a way so subtle that there would
be no suspicion, he suborned four persons by bribes
and money, there being among them an apostate monk, a
knight, a squire and a varlet.
To them he carried his
own sword, his dagger and a ring to be dedicated and
consecrated, or more properly speaking, desecrated in
the name of the devil. . . . And this apostate monk,
who was a master of such works, made several invoca
tions to devils several times and on many days. . . .
One Sunday, early in the morning before the sun was
up, on a mountain near the tower of Montjay, this
master did many things required to such invocations.
. . . and in doing these things he removed his clothes
and knelt on his knees, and stuck the sword and the
dagger into the ground, and the ring between them.
. . . And soon there came to him two devils in the
shapes of two men, dressed in brown cloth, one _
named Heremas and the other called Estramain. /The
items were taken away, and returned after_half an
hour by the devils, who said to the monkj_/ "It is
done, but you must put this into the mouth of a
dead man, as you know." . . . And to complete their
business, the monk, the squire and the varlet went
at night to the gallows at Montfaucon near Paris.
There they took one of the dead, newly hanged, which
they took away. . . . and then put the ring into the
mouth, and the sword and dagger they thrust up through
the rectum up into the chest, and left them there for
several days, just as the devils had ordered.^ 4

The fiendish design would have succeeded, Petit goes on, had
it not been for a knight of great honor, who discovered the plot
and betrayed it to the king; for which reason the duke of Orleans
brought about the knight's disgrace and ruin.

125

The Abbot of Cerisy disqualifies this charge.

His first

rebuttal is that, although a certain monk, with his accomplices,

10/

loc. cit., pp. 224-226.

For the original text, see Appendix,

loc. cit., pp. 226-227.
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had been tried before the king's council, there had never been any
question of the duke's complicity in the plot.

126

The Abbot's

second point is that the knight who was supposedly ruined by the
duke's revenge was actually banished from the kingdom after a
127
proper trial before the Parlement.

Consider then, my lords, how the proposition
of the adverse party contains only falsehood and
untruth; and those who read this libel may discern
error, which the masters of theology of the univer
sity of Paris ought to remedy as soon as they can;
for as they know very well, such things must not
be written or put about.
But what is even more
remarkable than this is that the mouth of a theo
logian should put it about that sorcery succeeded
in its object. . . . Sweet Lord! rectify this; I
see that a theologian affirms that sorcery is truly
efficacious, and certainly this is error since Holy
Scripture says that sorcery is only falsehood, and
has no effect.

Petit's accusation of sorcery is followed by the old charge
that Orleans' wife, Valentina Visconti, and her father Gian-Galeazzo,
duke of Milan, had conspired with the duke of Orleans to unseat
Charles VI.

This charge had been bandied about for some years, even

before Orleans' murder, and serves to illustrate the real background
of many of Petit's accusations against the duke.

■'■^Abbot of Cerisy, op. cit., p. 320.
127

loc. cit., p. 321. Aside from saying that the knight's
crime was "assez notoire" the Abbot does not specify what he
did.
128

loc. cit., pp. 321-322. For the original text, see
Appendix. This is said to be based on a verse from Ecclesiastes
23, but there are only twelve chapters in Ecclesiastes. The
closest approximation to a condemnation of sorcery in that
book is chapter five, verse seven.
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The duke of Burgundy had no reason to love or respect the
duke of Milan, whom he rightly suspected of harboring designs on
the maritime republic of Genoa.

In the 1390's, the Milanese duke

had entered into collusion with the duke of Orleans with the object
of creating for his son-in-law an independent sovereignty in Italy;
the hypothetical "kingdom of Adria" was to include Genoa and most
of the other Ligurian ports such as La Spezia.

When Orleans did,

in fact, acquire the sovereignty of Savona, adjacent to Genoa,
Burgundy could no longer tolerate the risk of the most important
ports of the western Mediterranean falling under Orleans' control.
In 1396, Burgundy, taking advantage of the city's chaotic political
situation, invited the Genoese to seek the protection of the French
crown.

Orleans' eventual acquisition of Genoa was blocked by

Burgundy's shrewd move.

129

Burgundy had at any rate safeguarded the

Italian end of his vital and lucrative Flemish textile trade.
The innuendo against the innocent duchess of Orleans was like
wise inspired by Burgundian prejudices.

It had been apparent from

the time of Valentina's marriage in 1389 that she exercised great
moral influence over her brother-in-law, the king; after he fell
ill, she alone was able to deal with him during his periods of
frenzy, and in his lucid intervals he frequently preferred to be
in her company rather than with his own wife.

1 ^0

Seeking to end

129

The best account and evaluation of the Genoa affair are
found in Jarry, op. cit., pp. 140ff.
130

On the king s relations with the duchess of Orleans see
Chamberlin, R . , "The Court of Charles VI," in History Today,
XIII, no. 2 (February, 1962), passim.
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her influence over the young king, the duke of Burgundy secured
her banishment from court in 1396, after spreading rumors that she
1 0*1

had enchanted the king and driven him mad.
The charge is also brought against the duke of Orleans that
he had made alliances with foreign enemies of the king and the realm.
The specific incident cited by Petit is that Orleans had signed an
alliance with Henry, duke of Lancaster (later Henry IV of England),
who in 1399 deposed his cousin Richard II of England, married to a
young daughter of Charles VI.

Richard was later murdered, whether

with Henry's consent or not being still undecided.

Petit draws from

this the conclusion that the alliance in question was made in order
to dispose of both Richard and Charles, so that Henry and Louis might
succeed to their respective thrones.

This wajs done_to destroy King Richard and also
to achieve /LouisW damnable intention. And these
two /Henry and Louis/ agreed to work and to plan
with all their power, and by whatever way or manner
should be possible for them, to kill and destroy
these two kings, to obtain the crowns of France and
England. . . . Henry succeeded in his intention,
biit Louis did not, thank God! . . • And thus was
/Louis/ a tyrant and disloyal to his prince and
sovereign lord and to the public good of this
kingdom; and did commit the crime of lese-majeste
in the second manner of the second degree.^ 2

•^^ibid.
Burgundian complicity in her banishment seems
proven by Jarry, op. cit., p. 168.
In April 1396 he had
Valentina's financial administration separated from that
of the other ladies of the royal family, and shortly
thereafter Valentina was sent from the court. A few weeks
after leaving Paris she gave birth to a child (July 1396),
loc. cit., p. 169.
1

Petit, op. cit., p. 235.
Appendix.

For the original text, see
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The actual alliance was signed by Henry and Louis in June 1399, while
Henry was in exile; a few weeks after they signed the pact, Henry
returned to England and by September had taken the crown from his
cousin Richard.

Petit, of course, had not seen the text of the

pact; this was printed in 1863 by the Societe de l'Histoire de
TOO

France and is available for investigation.

The terms of this

document are innocuous, amounting to nothing more than a declaration
of friendship, little more than what many lesser princes of royal
blood signed among each other— there is no question here of a
formal, purposeful alliance.

Orleans, in fact, repudiated the

alliance after it was learned in France that Richard had been
deposed, probably because the first clause in the treaty had
committed the signatories to protect and defend their sovereigns
against all enemies.

134

The foregoing charges are applied to the first degree of lesemajeste, i.e_., crimes committed against the king himself.

The

second degree embodies offenses perpetrated against the king's
consort— in this case, that Queen Isabeau, born a princess of
Bavaria, who made for herself so black a reputation.

Petit's

assertion here is that about four years before his death, the
duke of Orleans told the queen that her husband was of a mind to
repudiate her, or even to harm her, and advised her to leave Paris

■*-^The treaty is printed in Douet-d'Arcq (ed.), Pieces
inedites relatives au regne de Charles VI (Paris, 2 vols.,
1863), I, pp. 157-160.
134loc. cit., p. 158.
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for a place of greater safety.

Petit claims that the duke's true

intention was to imprison her with all her children in Luxembourg,
while pretending outwardly that she had gone off on an extended
pilgrimage
en-Brie.

. . t o Our Lady of Liesse.

. . or to Saint-Fiacre-

. . .1,135

And with this he greatly troubled the queen
many times over, repeating xp- effect these same
words, as I have set them forth above, intending
to have the queen and her children in his power,
to do with them as he would.
Whereat they were
in great peril, and would have been more so,
but that several well-wishers of the king, of the
queen and their family, of whom the queen asked
advice, directed her otherwise, since this was a
deception and a great danger.
Wherefore the queen,
well advised, changed her affairs, as she realized
the false and damnable intention of the late
criminal duke of Orleans, and decided to stay, and
not to go on such a journey. Thus, the second
article of my minor is done, in which I have shown
that the said criminal duke of Orleans did commit
the crime of lese-majeste in the second degree.

There is some slight factual basis for this charge, as there is for
most of Petit's charges, except that in this case the facts really
do not concern the duke of Orleans.

It is true that the mad king

manifested the most lively dislike of his wife, calling her names
and sometimes failing even to recognize her or their children.
It is also true that in 1402 the duke of Orleans bought the duchy
of Luxembourg.

There is not, however, the slightest bit of evi

dence to support Petit's claims that the duke actually tried to

135Petit, op. cit., p. 238.
136

ibid.

For the original text, see Appendix.
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kidnap the queen and her children.

This would in itself have been

a major undertaking; in 1404, four years before Petit gave his
speech, the king and queen had no fewer than eight children living.
In 1404, moreover, the first duke of Burgundy died, and the queen,
in an abrupt volte-face, confided her share in the government to
the duke of Orleans.

It is a definite possibility that by "well-

wishers" Petit was referring to the new duke of Burgundy, John
the Fearless, so that in basic terms he was attempting to show
Orleans' resurgence in the government, and the queen's new confidence in him, as an attempt at kidnaping.

137

The third degree of lese-majeste, according to Petit, consists
of crimes against the king's children, by which is probably meant
an attempt to alter or to disrupt the orderly succession to the
throne.

Petit here makes perhaps the most pathetic charge to be

found in the entire work:

that the duke of Orleans, attempting to

poison his infant nephew the dauphin, failed in his attempt and,
by chance, the poison was administered instead to his own son,
who suffered the consequences of his father's evil plot.

138

Petit

speaks here not of the dauphin who sat before him, but of an older
brother, a perpetually sickly child who died at the age of nine
in 1401.

139

It is true that the duke of Orleans lost several sons

137

Monstrelet makes no mention of such a journey on the
part of the queen; nor does Thibault mention it during the
period of time indicated by Petit, 1403 or 1404.
"^^Petit, op. cit., p. 239.
139

Petit refers to the dauphin "derrenier trespasse"
("lately deceased"), ibid.
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in infancy or early childhood.

Two died within a few months of

their birth, the very first in 1390 and another in 1393.

The second

son, Louis, born in 1391, survived to the age of four; it is
apparently of this child that Petit speaks.

The age of the child

is important, since Petit claims that the poison was to be admini
stered in an a p p l e . O r l e a n s '

eldest son, and also his third

son, died so very young that they could hardly have eaten an
apple.

Thus the charge might reasonably be applied tothe four-

year-old Louis; but the Abbot of Cerisy, having consulted the
ducal physicians, points out that the boy had shown no symptoms
of poison when he died.

It is indeed true that one of the sons of my
lord of Orleans died, during the course of a plague
of which many persons died at that time. On this
matter, let the doctors be heard; to wit, master
Guillaume le Boucher and master Jehan de Beaumont,
who attended this child, and they say that the
truth of it is, that this child did not die by
any poison. And consider, my lords, that this
accusation is hardly credible. For no nurse of
a son of my lord of Orleans would ever have dared
to give the child an apple, or even a pear, with
out permission of my lady of Orleans. And what
is_ more, when the nurse was walking in_the garden
/where she found the apple in question/ she was
not alone, but was accompanied by three or four
women of rank, who would never have suffered her
to give the child such a thing as an apple.

If such an attempt did take .place— and it seems more than doubtful—
it must have been between 1392, when the dauphin was born, and 1397,

140.
ibid.
141

Abbot of Cerisy, op. cit., pp. 331-332.
text, see Appendix.

For the original
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when the queen gave birth to her next son, thereby ensuring the
succession and making the dauphin's murder a useless gesture.
In the fourth degree of lese-majeste, Petit's charge finally
touches on one of the basic areas of contention between the dukes
of Orleans and Burgundy.

The charge is twofold.

First, the duke

of Orleans had maintained his own personal army within the king
dom, the soldiers of which ". . . did nothing but disturb and
molest the poor, pillage, rob, kidnap, steal, murder and rape."

142

Second, Orleans used royal and public funds for the upkeep of
this army, and frequently diverted tax returns to his own pocket
under the pretense of maintaining his garrisons.
It was at that time the usual practice for princes of the
royal house and for the most important nobles to be responsible
for their own standing forces, and it was on these forces that
the king relied in time of need, since there was no national army.
In 1386, for example, Charles VI had made every preparation to
cross the Channel and invade England, but had to abandon the
project at the last minute because his uncle, the duke of Berri,
was tardy in arriving at Sluys with his contingent of troops
from the Languedoc.

By the time Berri got to Sluys, it was November,

the weather had changed, and a safe crossing of the Channel was
i / •)

impossible.

It was established custom for the princes to be

paid allowances from the public coffers for the upkeep of their

142

Petit, op. cit., p. 241.

1/ Q

For this exp iition, see Lehoux, Frangoise, Jean de
France, due de Berri (Paris, 4 vols., 1968), II, pp. 184-188.
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troops; the duke of Orleans had received regular payments for the
maintenance of the garrisons in his county of Angouleme.'*'^

The

same sort of allowance had been paid to the dukes of Burgundy.
But there is no evidence that the troops of the duke of Orleans
conducted themselves in any worse fashion than did the soldiers
of any of the other princes.
The financial side of this accusation reveals a great deal.
Examination of the Burgundian finances between 1403 and 1407 shows
a steep decline in income after 1404, chiefly due to the cessation
of nearly all pensions, gifts and other payments from the French
royal treasury.

The year before his death, 1402-1403, Philip the

Bold had taken in 198,941 francs from that source, while between
1405 and 1407 the income enjoyed by his son John the Fearless from
the same source dwindled to 2000 francs.

In the same period, the

income of the duke of Orleans had increased to a yearly average
of 200,000 francs'l l

Thus Orleans was not exceeding to any great

extent the drain which had been made on the treasury by the duke
of Burgundy; but the difference between 198,000 francs every year
and 2000 francs was a very great one— about 196,000 francs less
than the Burgundian treasury was able to stand.
The Abbot of Cerisy counters this accusation with a similar
charge against the duke of Burgundy, pointing out that Orleans had

l^Jarry, op. cit., pp. 320-321.
^"Vaughan, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
146.
ibid.
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in point of fact only advised the queen to pay troops out of the
royal purse— although it is clear they must have been his troops.

It is well known how the queen and my lord of
Orleans went to Melun to protect themselves when
the adverse party came to Paris _/in 1405/ for no
good reason, with a great many soldiers, and b£
force_caused my lord /the dauphin/ to return /to
Paris/ while he was travelling to join his mother.
Later the adverse party strengthened his forces
in order to go to Melun against the queen and my
lord of Orleans. Thus it became necessary for
the queen to call up soldiers for her own pro
tection. And she was advised that it would be
good to use the treasury to pay these soldiers;
but my lord of Orleans took none of this to his
own profit. And when the king learned of this
he was most content. Thus it appears that these
funds were withdrawn only at the time of the
condemnable action of the adverse party, and
for no other reason..,-,
147
This charge is Petit's

last accusation.

last of his four degrees of lese-majeste.

He has covered the

His syllogism, he says,

is valid, and therefore the duke of Burgundy must not be punished
but rather rewarded, honored and praised.

His conclusion, instead

of dwelling further on the guilt of the duke of Orleans, hammers
home the innocence of the duke of Burgundy.

Thus it is clear, once my minor is joined to
my major, that my lord of Burgundy must not be held
blameworthy of anything that happened to the late
criminal duke of Orleans. And let the king not only
be content thereat, but let him take this action of
my lord of Burgundy to be agreeable. . . . And what

Abbot of Cerisy, op. cit., p. 333. For the original text,
see Appendix.
The incident referred to by Cerisy took place in
August 1405, during the preliminaries to the serious armed con
frontation between the dukes; see Monstrelet, op. cit., I, pp. 105-

112.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65

is more, the king ought to reward and replenish him
in three ways, to wit, in love, in honor and in
riches, according to the examples given of St. Michael
Archangel and the valiant man Phineas. . . . My
meaning is that the king our lord owes him more than
ever before, and must declare his renown and loyalty
throughout the kingdom; and outside the kingdom by
letters patent, by missives or other means.
Which,
may God grant be done. . . . Amen.

14o

It is worth noting that Petit refers here to the earlier example
of Zambri, slain by the "valiant man" Phineas.

The implication is

that the duke of Burgundy acted, like Phineas, under no mandate but
God's, even when no one else dared to act.
Cerisy's rebuttal ends much differently than Petit's work.

The

rebuttal is, in effect, of a much different

form than the Justifi

cation since there is no syllogism.

presents instead

Cerisy

three

articles, each based on a different text and concentrating on a
different aspect of the case.

The first article seeks to show that

the king is particularly obliged to do justice in this case.
argument is based on a text from the eighty-ninth psalm:

The

"Justice

and judgment are the habitation of thy throne; mercy and truth shall
go before thy face."

149

Cerisy derives six reasons why the king

is so obliged.

Of these reasons the first is the royal power
and dignity, which are obliged in this case not
only by will, but also by obligation of office; for
kings are called kings because they do justice, and
for no other reason. . . . The second reason is

148

Petit, op. cit., p. 241.

For the original text, see Appendix.

149

Abbot of Cerisy, op. cit., p. 274; but he says the verse
is from the seventy-eighth psalm.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
founded in fraternal love. . . . The king, as lord
and brother, according to justice and reason, must
maintain his right. The third reason is in the
pity of the supplicants; for my lady of Orleans,
unhappy widow, left with her children. . . . mourns
the cruel death of her husband and lord. The fourth
reason is the enormity of the case, a parallel for
which one may scarcely find. . . . The fifth reason
is, that if justice is not done in this matter, evil
without end may follow. . . . The sixth reason is
the
malevolence of the adverse party, who by power
and
force seeks to uphold his sins. . . . ^ q

Cerisy's

second article is based on Petit's own text, I Timothy 6:10,

and seeks to prove that
in killing his cousin.

the duke of Burgundy did commit a

grave sin

Again, six reasons are presented and later

expounded.

The first is that the adverse party had no
authority over the defunct duke by which he could
kill so great and noble a lord. . . . The second
is that the adverse party brought no form of jus
tice or trial against my lord of Orleans. . . .
The third reason is based on the alliances which
they had one with the other. . . . to avoid the
inconveniences which might ensue from their long
quarrel, according to which alliances they could
not, nor might not, injure or discommode the other
party without first challenging the other. . . .
The fourth reason is based in that the duke of
Orleans was so suddenly done to death, that no true
Christian can say that it was not damnable on the
part of the malfactor. . . . The fifth reason
is that, as I shall show, the adverse party caused
my lord of Orleans to be killed not for the common
good, nor for any good end, but because of covetous
ness, ambition and the desire to dominate. . . .
The sixth reason is that it did not suffice for the
adverse party merely to kill my lord of Orleans,
but he must also create a scandal and defame his

loc. cit., pp. 270-271, editor's note giving
manuscript variant. For the original text, see
Appendix.
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reputation by proposing a defamatory libel to
uphold his traitorous h o m i c i d e . ^

The third article is based on Psalms 7:8— "Judge me, 0 Lord, accor
ding to mine integrity that is in me."

The article contains the

refutations of Petit’s charges which have been referred to above.
Thus, rather than form a reasoned doctrine to oppose that of Petit,
the Abbot of Cerisy seeks instead to show that the king must do
justice in this case above all others, since the duke of Burgundy,
maliciously and without justification, committed a grave sin in
killing the innocent duke of Orleans.

The rebuttal of the Abbot

cannot, therefore, be taken as a counter-proposition to tyrannicide
in general, nor can it properly be said to have destroyed Petit's
entire argument; rather, the Abbot was more concerned with blasting
the "proofs" and "authorities" which were the chief foundations of
Petit's doctrine.
After such a lengthy dissertation, Cerisy concludes with an
extended exhortatory statement addressed to various members of the
royal family and the royal establishment.

0 thou! king of France! most excellent prince,
weep then, that thou hast lost thine only brother,
one of the most precious jewels of thy crown, for
whom thou most especially must procure justice.
0 thou! queen most noble, weep for the prince who
so honored thee, whom thou hast seen to die so
pitifully.
0 thou, my very redoubted lord, duke
of Aquitaine, weep! for thou hast lost the best
of all thy blood, of thy counsel, and thy nobility.
. . . 0 thou, duke of Berri, weep! who hast seen

151loc. cit., pp. 271-272.
Appendix.

For the original text, see
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the king's brother, thy nephew, end his life in
martyrdom, only because he was a king's brother.
0 thou, duke of Brittany, mourn the uncle of
thy spouse, who did love thee much. 0 thou,
duke of Bourbon, weep! for the apple of thine
eye is hidden in the earth. . . . Weep, men and
women, poor and rich, young and old, for the
sweetness of peace and tranquillity is torn from
you. . . . 0 you! wise men, men of the Church,
mourn the prince who so loved and honored you.
And for the love of God, you clerics, and noble
men of every rank, consider what may happen to you
because of these things. For the adverse party
has deceived you by false reasoning and for this
reason you have been favorable to him. . .

Petit's doctrine suffered a setback when the king's council
decided, after hearing Cerisy's rebuttal, to condemn the duke of
Burgundy.

Monstrelet, a Burgundian sympathizer, set it down

in his chronicle that, of the council which condemned the duke,
". . . the most part were supporters and favorable to the dowager
duchess of Orleans and her children."

153

It was decided that the

king ought to proceed against Burgundy " . . .

with all vigor,

according to the demands of justice, and if he would not submit,
the king, with all his vassals and subjects.
him to subjugate him and all his supporters."

. . would go against
154

The duke of Burgundy returned to Paris not long after this,
at the head of an army victorious in his struggles with the rebellious

152

loc. cit., pp. 334-336. For the original text, see
Appendix.
By the "duke of Aquitaine" is meant the dauphin,
who held the ducal title until the death of his brother in 1401.
He was apparently addressed as duke even while dauphin.
153
154

Monstrelet, op. cit., I, p. 387.
loc. cit., p. 388.
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citizens of Liege; shortly after his arrival,

. . all the

conclusions which before had been taken against him were brought
to nothing and invalidated.

In March 1409, the sons of the

dead duke of Orleans were compelled to make peace with his murderer
at Chartres, where the agreement made was blatantly in favor of
the duke of Burgundy.
The truce of Chartres was a political triumph for the duke of
Burgundy, and not a victory for Petit's Justification.

It cannot

be said to have been a defeat for the Abbot of Cerisy, since he had
not attempted to formulate a system or doctrine to oppose that of
Petit.

During the years of Burgundian supremacy in France, no

voice was raised against the duke, although the Justification was
condemned in 1414.
By that time, John the Fearless was too firmly seated for
anyone to challenge his domination of the kingdom.

The sons of the

duke of Orleans were mere boys; the oldest of them was only thirteen
when their father was killed in 1407, and they were never of much
importance in the kingdom.

The oldest son, Charles, who is known

today chiefly as a poet, was captured by the English at Agincourt
in 1415, and permitted by Burgundy to languish in exile for almost
half his life.
The Justification, then, lost its vigor within a remarkably
short time after it was first presented.

The political victory

of John the Fearless at Chartres in no way concerned the ideas

155loc. cit., p. 389.
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of the Justification; Petit had already outlived his usefulness and
was rusticated by the duke of Burgundy.

He died in obscurity a

few years later.
The Justification was an anachronism in its own time.

Petit

had relied heavily on antique sources, on tradition and on dis
tortion of meaning.

The result was an involved edifice depending

for its conclusion on the charges made against the duke of Orleans.
The progression of thought does not extend to all tyrants; the
reasoning becomes increasingly restricted to one individual.

Since

that individual was not the head of state, he did not fall within
the accepted definition of a medieval tyrant; thus a major point
of the syllogism was incompatible with the developments that had
taken place in political thought since John of Salisbury had
written in the twelfth century.
The too-smooth distinction between the letter and the meaning
of the law betrays an unskilled jurist— perhaps John the Fearless
himself?— or an overly subtle casuist.

The sudden departure in the

minor premise from political theory into name-calling destroys
the attempt to achieve a balanced theoretical system.
Whether Louis of Orleans was truly guilty of such crimes is
largely doubtful; the nature of the charges against him seems to
indicate their essential groundlessness.

It may be said, as it

has been said of many others, that his only guilt lay in the fact
that his style of living made it easy enough for such things to
be believed about him after his death.
The central figures of the events of 1407 and 1408 were a
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varied lot and came to varied ends.

The mad king, that pathetic

"sovereign lord" of Petit's work, lingered on until 1422, having
sat on the throne longer than any other king of his race— fortytwo years, although he was effectively king for only four.

The

widowed duchess of Orleans died of grief in December 1408, just
after the reversal of Burgundy's condemnation.

Queen Isabeau sur

vived until 1435, the last of them all; she died neglected and in
poverty, despised for her conduct and disowned by her son.
John of Burgundy did not meet his end in peace.
fitting that he should die violently.

It was only

In the absence of organized

opposition to his hegemony in France, the youngest son of the mad
king had gradually become the center of anti-Burgundian sympathies.
In 1415 and 1417 the two elder surviving sons of the king died,
and this youngest son, also named Charles, became the heir to the
throne.

By 1419 he was at the head of a sizeable opposition party

known as the Armagnacs, after a powerful southern noble who had
led the party for a few years before young Charles became associated
with it.
In March 1419 the new dauphin invited Burgundy to a conference
to be held on the bridge cf Montsoreau, at the confluence of the
Seine and the Aisne.

The gradual weakening of his position more

or less forced John into going.

A few minutes after he and Charles

had entered from opposite sides into the temporary pavilion on the
bridge, the dauphin gave a quick nod of his head.

With no hesi

tation, his attendants fell on John and killed him.
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APPENDIX
Original texts

D'Aristote a Boccace, tyrannie signifie un gouvernement ne
de 1 'usurpation ou exerce par la violence et la mechancete, pour
le profit exclusif du tyran.
II ne s'agit nullement des abus de
pouvoir, des intrigues et des ambitions excessives, des manoeuvres
quelles qu'elles soient d'un prince seulement voisin du trone dans
un monarchie reconnue comme legitime et reguliere, avec tous ses
organes de justice. Jean Petit aura, par suite, grand’peine a
adapter les faits de sa mineure a 1 'expose theorique de sa majeure.
C'est dans ce sens que l ’on peut dire qu ’il a largement abuse des
autorites auxquelles il se refere et trahi volontairement les
opinions des auteurs q u ’il cite..
(Text, p. 30)
II est oblige entre les autres mortelz a le garder, defendre
et venger de toutes injures a son pouvoir; et ce, il a bien recongneu
recongnoist et recongnoistra se Dieu plaist, et aura en son cuer en
memoire les obligacions^ dessus dic_tes, qui sont douze en nombre.
C'estassavoir, comme /bon chretien/, proisme parent, vassal, subject,
baron, conte, due, per, due per, doien des pers, et les deux mariages
(Text, p. 32)
Car je n'oseroie parler de ceste matiere, ne dire les choses
qui me sont chargees, se ce n ’estoit par le commandement de mondit
seigneur de Bourgongne.
Apres ce, je proteste que je n'entens a injurier quelque personne, qui soit ou puist estre, soit vif ou trespasse. Et s ’il
advient que je die aucunes paroles sentans injures, pour et ou nom
de mondit seigneur de Bourgongne et a son commandement, je prie
que on me ait pour excuse, en tant q u ’elles sont a sa justification
et non autrement.
(Text, p. 33)
Ainsi appert-il clerement par cest article de saint Jehan qu'il
est trois manieres de convoitise qui encloent en elles tous pechez.
. . . Et ainsi prenoit l ’Apotre convoitise en la parole proposee.
Et quant il disoit: Radix omnium malorum cupiditas, c'estassavoir
convoitise es trois manieres dessusdictes touchees par saint Jehan
l'Evangeliste. . . . Ainsi appert clerement estre vray mon premier
article, ou je disoie que convoitise est cause et racine de tous
maulx, a le prendre ainsi que le prenoit l'Apostre quant il disoit:
Radix omnium malorum cupiditas.
(Text, p. 34)
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Pour entrer en la matiere du second article, je metz une
suspicion, et suppose que c'est ung des greigneurs pechez qui soit
ou puist estre que crime de leze-majeste royale. Et la cause
si est, car c'est la plus noble chose et la plus digne qui puist
estre que majeste royale pour ce qu'on ne peut faire plus grant
peche, ne plus grant crime que de injurier majeste royale, et
selon ce que le crime est plus grant, 1 'injure est greigneur et
fair plus a punir.
Pour quoy il est assavoir qu'il est deux
manieres de majestez royaulx, l'une est divine et perpetuelle,
et 1 'autre est humaine et temporelle.
(Text, p. 35)
Et oultre plus. . . ces deux manieres de crimes de lese-majeste
divine et humaine sont les plus horribles qui puissent estre, les
drois y ont ordonne certaines peins plus grandes qu'aux autres
crimes.
C'est assavoir, que ou cas d'heresie ou de lese-majeste
humaine ung homme en peut estre accuse apres sa mort, et se peut
former proces contre lui. Et s'il advient que il soit convaincu
et actaint de heresie, il doit estre desterre et ses os mis en
ung sac et portez a la justice et ars en ung feu. Et semblablement
se il advient que ung homme soit actaint et convaincu de crime
de lese-majeste humaine apres sa mort, il doit estre desterre et
ses os mis en ung sac, tous ses biens meubles et immeubles forfaiz,
confisquez et acquis au prince, et ses enfans declairez inhabiles
a toute succession.
(Text, p. 36)
Le tiers exemple est d'un prince et due de Symeon, qui fut une
des douze lignees des enfans d'Israhel, lequel prince estoit moult
puissant hemme et grant seigneur et avoit nom Sambry. Lequel fut
si espris de convoitise et de delectacion charnelle de 1 'amour
d'une paienne, qu'elle ne se vouloit accorder a faire sa voulente
s'il ne aouroit ses ydoles. II les aoura et les fist aourer par
plusiers de ses subgetz, desquelz la saincte Escriture dist. . . .
Dont Dieu se courrouga tres durement, et dist a Moyse, qui estoit
le souverain seigneur et due de tous les autres du peuple:
"Pren
tous les princes du peuple, et les fais prendre au gibet contre
le soleil." Et pour quoy disoit-il tous les princes? pour ce que
la pluspart d'iceulx estoit consentant d'icellui crime. Et les
autres, ja soit qu'ilz n'en feussent point consentans, ilz estoient
negligens de prendre vengence de si grande injure faicte a Dieu
leur Createur.
Tantost Moyse ala assembler tous les princes et
tout le peuple d'Israel et leur diet ce que Dieu lui avoit dit
et commande, le peuple print a pleurer, pour ce que les malfacteurs
estoient si puissans que les juges n'osoient faire justice. . . .
Lors ung vaillant homme nomine Phinees print courage en lui et dist
en son cuer, je voue e Dieu que presentement le vengeray de ceste
injure.
Si se parti sans mot dire, sans quelconques commandement
de Moyse, ne d'autre a ce aiant povoir, et s'en vint au logis, ou
il trouva icellui due avec icelle dame, l'un sur 1 'autre, faisant
oeuvre de delit, et d'un coustel qu'il avoit en maniere de dague,
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et les occist tous deux ensemble.
(Text, p. 37)
Quant au tiers article de madicte majeur, ou je doy monstrer
par exemples et par auctoritez de la Bible, laquelle nul n'oseroit
contredire, c'est assavoir que dame convoitise a fait plusiers
estre traistres et desloiaulx envers leurs souverains seigneurs,
ja soit ce que a ce propos je pourroie mectre les exemples et
auctoritez, tant de la saincte Escripture comme d'aiileurs, mais
je me restraindray a trois.
(Text, p. 39)
Si tost que saint Michel apperceut cela, il s'en vint a lui et
lui dist que c'estoit tres mal fait et que jamais ne voulsist faire
telle chose, et que, de tant que Dieu l'avoit fait plus bel et
plus parfait de tous les autres, de tant devoit-il monstrer plus
grant signe de reverence, subjection et obeissance a cellui qui
l'avoit fait, qui estoit son roy et son souverain seigneur. Lucifer
lui respondi qu'il n'en feroit riens.
Saint Michel dist que lui
et les autres anges ne souffreroient point telles injures faire a
leur createur et souverain seigneur.
Briefment, bataille se mut
entre cellui Lucifer et saint Michel. . . . S t . Michel occist
icellui Lucifer de mort pardurable.
Car icellui Lucifer et les
autres anges de sa bende furent par force chassez hors de paradis
et trebuchez en enfer.
De quoy dist saint Jehan l'Evangeliste:
Causa dracone et draco pugnabat et angeli ejus cum e o .
(Text, p. 40)
Mais aucuns pourroient arguer contre les choses dessusdictes
pour ce, quant le roy David fut au lit de la mort, il charga son
filz Salomon qui devoit estre roy regnant apres lui, qu'il fist
justice dudit Joab. A ce je respons que ce ne fut pas pour le
cas dessusdit.
Car, nonobstant que Joab feust bon chevalier et'
loial ou temps qu'il occist ledit Absalon, neantmoins envers la
fin_de ses jours il occist ung tres bon chevalier, nomme Amaza. . . .
/et/ le prince Abner, aussi par grant trayson.
(Text, p. 41)
Ainsi avez vous le troisiesme exemple, qui est comment con
voitise de honneur vaine, qui n'est autre chose que concupiscence
et voulente desordonnee a tolir a autrui sa noble dominacion et
seigneurie, fist ladicte royne estre murdriSre, faulse et desleale, pour obtenir par force tirannique la couronne et seigneurie
du royaume de Jherusalem. Et si avez oy comment par agaiz et
espiemens elle fut occise. Car c'est droit raison et equite que
tous tirans soient occis vilainement par agais et espiemens, et
est la propre mort dont doivent mourir les tirans desleaux.
(Text, p. 41)
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La premiere /verite/ est que tout subject universel qui par
convoitise, barat, sortilege et malengin machine contre le salut
de son roy et souverain seigneur, pour lui tolir et soubztraire
sa tres noble et haulte seigneurie, il peche si griefment et commet
si horrible crime, comme crime de lese-majeste royale ou premier
degre, et par consequent il est digne de double mort. . . . Je
preuve madicte proposicion.
Car tout tel subject et vassal est
grant ennemy et desloyal au souverain seigneur et peche mortellement;
donques ma conclusion est vraye. Et qu'il soit tirant, je le preuve
par monseigneur saint Gregoire, qui dist ainsi: Tirannus est
proprie, etc.
Qu'il commet de crime de lese-majeste, il appert
clerement par la distinction dessusdicte des degrez de lese-majeste
royale en la personne du prince. Qu'il soit digne de double mort,
je le preuve.
Car, par la premiere mort j'entens mort corporelle,
qui est separacion du corps et de l'ame, et par la mort seconde je
n'entens autre chose que dampnacion pardurable. . . . C'est a dire
que toute humaine creature qui aura victoire finablement sur
convoitise et ses trois filles, il n'aura garde de la mort seconde,
c'esassavoir de pardurable dampnacion.
(Text, p. 43)
Car en mondit degre, l'obligacion est plus grande a vouloir
garder le salut du Roy et la chose du bien publique.
Donques ceulx
qui font le contraire font plus a punir, en montant de degre en
degre. . . . Car, quant que la personne est plus prouchaine du
Roy et plus noble, s'il fait les choses dessusdictes, de tant est-ce
plus griefve esclande que n'est d'une personne qui est loingtaine
du Roy. C'est plus grande esclande que ung grant due et puissant
seigneur, prouchain parent du Roy, machine sa mort pour lui tolir
sa seigneurie, que ce seroit d'un povre subject qui n'est point
son parent. De tant que le machineur seroit plus prouchain du
Roy et du plus grant puissance, de tant seroit la chose plus inique,
et de tant seroit de plus grant esclande, et par consequent seroit
plus a punir.
(Text, p. 44)
II est licite a chascun subject, sans quelque mandement, selon
les lois morales, natureles et divines, de occire ou faire occire
traistre desloial ou tirant, et non point seulement licite, mais
honnorable et meritoire, mesmement quant il est de si grant puissance
que justice n'y peut estre faicte bonnement par le souverain.
Je
prouve ceste verite par douze raisons, en 1 'honneur des douze
apostres. Desquelles raisons, les trois premiers sont trois auc
toritez de trois philosophes moraulx.
Les autres trois, sont de
trois auctoritez de saincte Eglise. Les autres trois, sont de
trois lois civiles et imperiales.
Et les trois dernieres sont
exemples de la saincte Escripture.
(Text, p. 44)
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0 vous princes! considerez que se telles doctrines estoient
soustenues, chascun pourroit dire: aussi bien puis-je occire
comme fist tel.
II vous plaise donques condemner ceste faulse
et desloiale doctrine comme perilleuse, sedicieuse et abhominable.
Et puis dira partie adverse et tous a lui portans faveur en
ceste partie, le diet de Jheremie, ou XXe chapitre:
Confundentur
vehementur qui non intellexerunt obprobrium sempiternum quod
nunquam delebitur.
(Text, p. 45)
C'est a dire, quant, dit saint Thomas d'Aquin, aucun regoit
par violence aucune dominacion sans la voulente des subjects,
et par consentement de contrainte et on ne peut avoir retour ou
recours a souverain par lequel puist estre fait jugement de tel
agresseur.
Adonc, cellui qui occit tel tirant pour la delivrance
du pays, est a loer, et prend et reqoit grand guerredon. A ce
je respons que ce ne fait riens a propos. Car monseigneur
d'Orleans n'envaist onques aucune dominacion par violence. . . .
Je dy consequemment que saint Thomas parle de celui qui peut
estre trouve tirant, et monseigneur d'Orleans ne 1 'estoit
point, comme il est assez declaire.
(Text, p. 47)
Ceste auctorite ne fait riens au propos, pour ce ne semble il
point que ledit apostre vueille dire, ne que son entencion soit,
que ung due ait la dominacion ou seigneurie sur tout un royaume,
mais tant seulement sur son pays. Autrement il s'ensuivroit
qu'en Bretaigne, en Berry et es autres duchez du royaume on ne
deust obeir fors au due de Bourgongne. Ainsi donques appert
comment ledit proposant abuse de la Sainct Escripture, en tant
qu'il s'efforce par maniere d'argument icelle amener a son propos.
(Text, p. 47)
Et pour ce que je ne suis point legiste, il me suffit de
dire la sentence des lois sans les alleguer, car en toute ma
vie je ne fus estudiant que deux ans en droit canon et civil,
et y a plus de vingt ans passez, pour quoy je n'en puis gueres
sqavoir, et ce que lors je en peuz aprendre, je l'ay oublie
par la longueur du temps. . . .
(Text, p. 48)
La septiesme raison, avec deux autres ensuivans, est fondee
es lois civiles, qui disent estre trois manieres de hommes lesquelz
occire est chose licite, c'estassavoir, ceulx qui delaissent
chevalerie, les agaitans des chemins, et les larrons de nuit
trouvez es maisons. A ce, je dy que monseigneur d'Orleans ne
fut onques de telles condicions.
Je dy que les lois ne commandent
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point telz gens a occire, fors tant seulement en cas de peril
inevitable, et sont icelles choses loing de noz termes, comme
mondit seigneur d'Orleans ne feust point agaiteur de chemins,
la mercy Dieu! ne larron de nuit.
Et n'est loy au monde par
laquelle, partie adverse peust estre excuse.
(Text, p. 49).
Pour ce est assavoir qu'en toutes lois a deux choses, la
premiere le principe ou la sentence textuale, 1 'autre si est
la cause pour quoy on la faict faire, a laquelle fin les condicions d'icelle loy entendoient principalement. Et quant
ilz scavoient que la sentence estoit contraire a la fin de
la loy, c'estassavoir a la fin pour quoy ladicte loy fut faicte,
on doit expliquer ladicte loy a 1 'entente de la fin, et non point
au fait licteral ou sentence textual. . . . Au propos:
les
lois dessusdictes qui dient que nul ne doit prendre auctorite
de justice fors le Roy, ne faire port d'armes sans licence
du prince, je dy que ces lois furent faictes pour gardei: l'onneur
du Roy,_de sa personne et de la chose publique. . . . Ajuant
je voysV ung tirant de grant puissance et auctorite, subtillement
machinant de toute sa puissance a la mort du Roy continuellement
par baratz et malefices. . . . dois-je faire pour garder le
sens licteral d'icelles lois? Nennil, ains doy defendre mondit
Roy, et occire le tirant. Et en ce faisant, ja soit ce que je
face contre le sens licteral desdictes lois, je ne feray point
contre la fin pour quoy elles furent donnees et faictes, mais
accompliray le commandement final d'icelles lois. . . .
(Text, p. 50)
Tercium correlarium. Tout subject qui soubz dissimulacion et
faintise de jeux et esbatemens, appenseement et de la malice de
matiere inflammable, c'estassavoir a embraser et alumer et tres
mauvaise a estaindre, procurer faire vestemens pour vestir son
Roy, et qui plus est lui faire vestir avec plusiers autres et y
bouter le feu a escient pour le cuider ardoir et lui tolir et
soubstraire sa noble seigneurie, il commet crime de lese-majeste
ou premier degre et est tirant, traistre et desloial a son Roy. . . .
(Text, p. 51)
Or viens-je a affermer et declairer ma dicte mineur, en laquelle
j'ay a monstrer que feu Loys nagueres due d'Orleans, fut tant
embrase de convoitise et honneurs vaines et richesses mondaines,
c'estassavoir de obtenir pour soy et sa generacion, et de toler
et substraire pardevers lui et sa generacion, la tres haulte et
tres noble seigneurie de la couronne de France au Roy nostresire,
qu'il machina et estudia par convoitise, barat et sortileges et
malengins, pour destruire la personne du Roy, de ses enfans et
generacion, en tant qu'il fut espris de tirannie, convoitise et
temptacion de l'ennemi d'enfer, que, comme tirant a son Roy et
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souverain seigneur, il commist crime de lese-majeste divine
et humaine en toutes les manieres^ et degrez declairez en
madicte mineur /sic, leg, majeur/. . . .
(Text, p. 53)
Car il est verite, que pour faire mourir la personne du Roy
en langueur et par maniere si subtile q u ’il n'en feust apparence,
il fist, par force d'argent et diligence, tant q u ’il fina de
quatre personnes, dont l ’une estoit moyne apostat, l'autre
chevalier, l ’autre escuier, et l'autre varlet. Ausquelz il
bailla sa propre espee, sa dague et ung annel pour dedier
et pour consacrer, ou au plus promptement parler, execrer
au nom des dyables. . . . Et ledit moyne-apostat, qui estoit
maistre de celle oeuvre fist plusieurs invocations de dyables et
par plusiers foiz et journees. . . . Ung dimanche tres matin devant
soleil levant, sur une montaigne, pres de la tour de Montjay,
ledit maistre fist plusieurs choses superstitieuses requises a
faire telles invocacions de dyables empres ung buisson, et en
faisant lesdictes invocacions se despoulla en sa chemise et se mist
a genoulx, et ficha ladicte espee et la dicte dague par les pointes
en terre, et le diet annel mist aussi empres. . . . Et tantoast
vindrent a lui deux dyables en forme de deux homines, vestus ainsi
que de brun verd, dont l'un avoit nom Heremas et l'autre Estramain.
. . . Et oultre, pour parfaire lesdiz malefices, icellui moyne,
escuyer et varlet, s ’en vindrent par nuit au gibet de Montfaulcon
lez Paris. La, prindrent l ’un des mors nouvellement pendu, lequel
ilz despendirent et mirent sur ung cheval. . . . et puis lui
mirent ledit annel en la bouche, et ladicte espee et dague lui
ficherent ou corps parmy le fondement jusques a la pectrine, et
la demourerent par plusiers jours ainsi que la dyable leur avoit
dit et ordonne.
(Text, p. 54)
Considerez, Messeigneurs, comment la proposicion de partie
adverse ne contient que faulsetez et menqonges, et que les lisans
son libelle pourroient de leger cheoir en erreur, dont sur ce
devroient mectre remede les reverens maistres de la faculte de
theologie le plus tost que faire se pourroit; car, comme ilz
scevent bien, telles choses ne devroient point estre escriptes,
ne divulgees. Mais plus merveuilleuse chose est que par la
bouche d'un theologien il a este profere que lesdiz malefices
ont sorti leur effect en la personne du Roy. . . . 0 tres-doulx
Dieu! metz remede en ce. Car je vois theologiens affermer que
sorceries sortissent leur effect, certainement c'est erreur
comme la saincte Escripture die que sorcerie ne sont fors menqonges
et ne sortissent quelque effect.
(Text, p. 55)
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Si fist tant qu'il eut aliances avecques lui:
1'une pour
destruire le roy Richard, et l'autre pour renforcer et rendre
puissance a parvenir a sa dampnable entencion.
Et furent
d'accord les dessusdiz de labourer et machiner de toute leur
puissance et par toutes les manieres et voies possibles a
eulx, a la mort et destruction des deux roys, pour obtenir
les deux couronnes de France et de 1'Angleterre. . . . Henry
est venu a son entente, mais Loys non, la Dieu-mercy! . . .
Et ainsi fut-il tirant et desloial a son prince et souverain
seigneur. . . .
(Text, p. 57)
Et de ce faire oppressa fort ladicte Royne et par plusiers
foiz. en recitant en effect les paroles telles que je les ay
couchees, tendant a fin d'avoir ladicte Royne et sesdiz enfans
pour en faire sa voulente. Dont ilz furent en grant peril,
et eussent este encores plus, se n'eussent este aucuns bienvueillans du Roy, de ladicte Royne et de sesdiz enfans, ausquelz
ladicte Royne se conseilla, lesquelz lui dirent que c'estoit une
decepcion et tres grant peril. Pour laquelle chose ladicte
Royne, bien advisee, mua son propos, apparcevant la faulse
et dampnable entencion du dit feu criminel due d'Orleans, et
se determina a demourer pardeqa et non aler audit voiage.
Ainsi appert le deuxiesme article de madicte mineur, ouquel
je monstre que ledit criminel due d'Orleans a commis crime de
lese-majeste ou second degre.
(Text, p. 59)
Mais est verite que l'un des filz de monseigneur d'Orleans
mourut ja pieqa, du cours de ventre dont plusieurs mourut a
ce temps. Et sur ce, soient oys les phisiciens, c 'estassavoir
maistres Guillaume le Boucher et Jehan de Beaumont, qui visiterent
icellui filz, et ilz en dirent la verite, c'estassavoir que
point il ne mourut par intoxication.
(Text, p. 61)
II est notoire comment la Royne et monseigneur d'Orleans
alerent a Meleun pour eulx esbatre et comment partie adverse
vint a Paris irraisonnablement, a tout grant compaignie de
hommes d'armes, et par sa puissance fist retourner monseigneur
d'Aquitaine alant apres la Royne, sa mere.
Consequemment il
se fortifia de hommes d'armes soubz intencion d'aler a Meleun
contre la Royne et monseigneur d'Orleans. Adonc fut-il necessaire
a la Royne de mander gens de guerre pour la seurete et garde
d'elle.
Et fut advise qu'il seroit bon de prendre ledit tresor
pour paier lesdictes gens d'armes; ne monseigneur d'Orleans
n'en appliquera onques a son prouffit. Et quant le Roy eut
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de ce congnoissance, il fut bien content.
Et ainsi il appert que
lesdictes pecunes furent despendues tant seulement a 1 *occasion du
fait dampnable de partie adverse, et non d'autrui.
(Text, p. 64)
Et en oultre appert, madicte mineur declairee, laquelle joinct
a madicte majeur, s'ensuit clerement que mondit seigneur de Bour
gongne ne veult et ne doit en riens estre blasme, ne reprins, dudit
cas advenu en la personne dudit criminel due d'Orleans. Et que
le Roy nostre sire ne doit pas tant seulement estre content, mais
doit avoir mondit seigneur de Bourgongne et son fait pour agreable.
. . . Et l'entens ainsi, que le Roy nostresire lui doit, plus que
devant, sa loyaulte et bonne renommee faire prononcer par tout
le royaume, et dehors le royaume publier par lectres patentes, par
maniere d'epistre ou autrement.
Icellui Dieu vueille que ainsi
soit fait. . . . Amen.
(Text,

p. 64)

Desquelles raisons la premiere est
la puissance et dignite
royale, a ce nonmie tant seulement obliges par volonte, mais aussi
par obligacion d'office. . . . La seconde raison est fondee en
1'amour fraternelle. . . . Le Roy doncques comme seigneur et
frere, selon justice et raison, doit maintenir son droit. La
tierche raison est la pitie des supplians.
Car madame d'Orleans,
vesve et desconfortee, est accompagniee
de ses jones enfans. ., . .
menans grant dueil pour la cruelle mort
de son mary et seigneur.
La quarte raison est l'enormite du cas, que a paines pourroit
on trouver pareil. . . . La quinte raison est, que se sur ce n'est
faicte execution de justice, maulx sans nombre s'en pourroient
ensievir. . . .La sixiesme raison est la mauvaistie de partie
adverse, laquelle par sa force et puissance quiert a seustenir
son pechiez. . . .
(Text, p. 65)
La premiere raison est: car partie adverse n'avoit nulle auc
torite sur le defunct par quoy il feist occire si grant et si
noble seigneur. . . . La seconde raison est: car partie adverse
nullement ne met forme de justice ou proces en 1 'execution de la
mort de feu mondit seigneur d'Orleans. . . . La tierce raison
est fondee es aliances qu'ilz avoient ensemble, non mie seulement
pour cause de lignage. . . pour eviter les inconveniens qui se
povoient ensuivir pour la cause de leur division. . . .La quarte
raison est fondee en ce que la mort de mondit seigneur d'Orleans
fut si soudaine, que nul vray chrestien ne pourroit soustenir que
elle ne feust dampnable ou regard du malfaicteur. . . .La quinte
raison est fondee en ce, que evidemment je demonstreray, que partie
adverse a fait occire mondit seigneur d'Orleans, non mie pour bonne
fin, ne pour le bien commun, mais pour ambicion et convoitise et
desir de dominer. . . . La sixiesme raison et finale est en ce qu'il
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ne souffist pas a partie adverse la mort de monseigneur d'Orleans,
mais avecques ce s'est efforce de scandaliser et detruire sa
renommee en proposant libelle diffamatoire, et en soustenant les
traistres homicides. . . •
(Text, p. 66)
0 tu roy de France! prince tres excellent, pleure donques ton
seul frere germain que tu as perdu l'une des precieusez pierres de
la couronne, duquel toy mesmes devroies faire ou procurer la justice.
0 toy! Royne tres noble, pleure le prince qui tant te honnouroit,
lequel tu vois mourir si pitieusement. . . . Et vous tous autres,
hommes et femmes, povres et riches, jeunes et vieulx, car le doulceur
de paix et de transquilite vous est ostee estant. . . . 0 vous!
hommes d'eglise et sages, pleurez le prince qui tres grandement vous
aymoit et honnouroit. Et pour 1'amour de Dieu, vous clercs, et
nobles hommes de tous et divers estats, considerez comment en ces
choses doresnavant vous ferez.
(Text, p. 67)
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